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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCriCK
Statement of orobiem.

The pnrpoee of this study w s

to present under one cover briefs of the Supreme Court.de
cisions affecting school law in the State of North Dakota,
and to point out the principles and trends underlying these
decisions.
Importance of study.

As a result of this study

school administrators, teachers* school boards and other
Interested persons may become acquainted with litigation
pursuant to the organisation* administration^ and conduct
of schools and school districts in this state.
By statements of general and specific principles*
and quotations from illustrative, statutes and court deci
sions* this presentation may also be used as source material
in a North Dakota school law and school history course.
Limitations of the study.

Because they set the

precedents which JTorm one of the foundations of school law*
only cases that were appealed to North Dakota Supreme Court
were considered.

These cases include litigation arising

from territorial years* 1879* through 1953.
*

Method of presentation and sources.

The cases are

briefed in the language of the law court ; but where legal
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might h#ve

th# ImymmA, th«lr employment has

been circemvemted# wherever poeslble» hy translating them
Intm common t erminelegy»

Also the eases were abstracted

with appropriate citations Streeting the reader to further
Investigation of the entire case.

The citation consists of

the names of the litigants» the volume and page number of
the source, and the date of the Supreme Court's decision.
Following the citation are the essential facts of the case,
then the rule of law or holding and opinion of the court.
In every case, the authority of the court was recog-*
nised as the final adjudicator.

The abstract front each case

was prepared without any interpolation or personal views to
alter or change the facts a n d the rule established b y the
law court.
It is not possible, nor is it expedient, in a project
of this kind, wherein abstracts are presented, to set forth
all the facts peculiar to each of the reported cases; but
the core fact or facts that led to the action at law are
stated.

Some of the abstracts are considerably long, while

others are markedly brief.

The length of abstracts depended

upon a variety of factors:

volume of facts and evidence,

narrowness or breadth of application to school law, signifi
cance of action, and number of rules and/or holdings in each
litigat ion.
The cases comprising this thesis appear in the North
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Dakota Report* and tka M o r t h w a t a m Reporter (see bibliog
raphy) ;

Eaek of these soarcea is cited by volame aad page

namber after the mame-ideatificatiom of the appropriate case.
North Dakota Reports contains the cases tried before
the Sapreme Court of North Dakota; the Northwestern Reporter
contains all cases tried before Supreme Courts in seven
statest North Dakota included.
The Northwestern Reporter series employs the Key
system reporting device originated by the West Publishing
Company.

The system facilitates reference to similar cases

in other states because the identical K e y number, pointing
to specific topical headings in all points of law, is used
by regional reporters throughout the United States.

For

example. K e y 13, under the general topic of Schools and
School Districts, treats of separate schools for colored
pupils.

No actions relative to this problem have been taken

into North Dakota courts, but cases In point m a y be discov
ered in other states under the K e y 13 nastber.
Because of the universality of the K e y system of
reporting cases at law, that method of organisation and
reference was used in this thesis.

State reports are not

based upon the Key system, but all regional reporters are;
however, the cases In both series reporters, state and,re
gional, are presented with only minor changes in editing;
no revisions are made in the facts and rules involved.
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In order to be consistent vltb the broad organisation
of this thesis, the K e y system is employed at the outset to
formulate the Table of Contents.

General headings are fol

lowed by K e y topics, which in turn have the pertinent cases
listed under them.
The cases are presented under a system of crossreferencing iriilch, %Aere more than one ruling prevails in a
given case, re-cites the case in another appropriate K e y
area, with a statement of the rule pertaining to that p a r 
ticular K e y topic.
vantages :

This procedure creates the following ad

(1) It facilitates content research, (2) it

places the rules,

laws, and holdings into their appropriate

school law areas, and (3) it eliminates unwieldiness and
confusion in the employment of the thesis.
The thesis is divided into eleven chapters.
Chapter

1.

Chapter

II.

Chapter

111.

Introduction.
Private Schools and Academies.
Establishment, School Lands, Funds,
and Regulations In General.

Chapter

IV.

Creation, Alteration, Existence,

and

Dissolution of Districts.
Chapter

V,

Government, Officers, and District
Meetings.

Chapter

VI.

District Property, Contracts and
Liabilities.
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Chapter

VII. District Debts; Securities

and

Taxation.
Chapter VIII.
Chapter
Chapter

Claims Against Districts, and Actions.

IX. Teachers.
X. Pupils and Conduct and Discipline of
Schools.

Chapter

XI. Summary and Conclusions.

Bibliography.
The phrase, "No cases in North Dakota," which appears
at times in the table of contents and within the body of the
thesis, means that no cases within a given area of school
litigation have been reviewed by the North Dakota Supreme
Court.
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CHAPTER 11
r:
PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES
K e y I.

EstablishaeRt and status In general.

No cases in North Dakota.
' Key 2.

Incorporation and organisation.
(a)

Gerhardt v. Held.

( 1936)

26? N. W. 12?

(66 N. D. i|i*4)

This is an action by the plaintiffs; as electors and
taxpayers of a school district, against the directors and
other officers of the school district, and four teachers in
the schools in the district.
FACTS ;

During the term opening In September, 193$,

six teachers were employed in the Gladstone consolidated
school (Stark County); four of these teachers were nuns,
members of the Sisterhood of St. Benedict.

There %fas no

claim and no evidence that any religious instruction or
religious exercises were conducted.
The evidence is to the effect that the four teachers
in question wore the habit of the Sisterhood and that they
turned part of their earnings over to the Sisterhood of St.
Benedict.
The object of this action was to restrain the teach
ers from wearing what is denominated "a religious garb or
dress* while engaged in teaching a public school.
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QUESTION ; Whether the fact that the teachers con
tribute to the Sisterhood a large part of their earnings and
wear their particular garb during school hours constitutes a
violation of the Constitution and laws of North Dakota and
infringes the rights of the plaintiffs so as to entitle them
to injunctive relief.
HOLDING; The laws of the state do not prescribe the
fashion of dress of the teachers in our schools.
The fact that the teachers contributed a share of
their earnings to the religious order of which they are mem
bers is not violative of the Constitution.

A person in the

employ of the state or any of its subdivisions is not in
hibited from contributing money, which he or she has earned
by service so performed, for the support of s(me religious
body of which he or she is a member.

To deny the right to

make such contribution constitutes a denial of that right of
religious liberty %diich the Constitution guarantees.
DECISICN: Judgment for the defendants.
Public school held not made "sectarian school" merely
because teachers wear habit of religious order while engaged
in teaching and contribute portion of their earnings to
Sisterhood or order.
Key 3-7.
Key 8,

No cases in North Dakota.
Pupils, tuition, and discipline.
(a)

Rule V, Connealy.

(1931)

237 N. W. 197

•
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(61 N, D. 57)
(This case is not pertinent to a study of schools and
school districts, having to do primarily with principles
pertaining to notes, contracts, performance, involved in a
privately solicited correspondence course.)
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CHAPTER 111
ESTABLISHMENT9 SCHCX3L LANDS AND FUNDS,
AND REGULATIONS IN GENERAL
K#v

9.

Power to establish and maintain in general.
No cases in North Dakota*

Key 10.

Constitutional and statutory provisions.
(a)

State ex rel Sathre v. Board of

University and School Lands of North Dakota*

( 1935)

262 N. W. 60 (65 N. D. 68?)
Action by the State, on the relation of P. O. Sathre,
Attorney General, against the Board of University and School
Lands of North Dakota, and another, to enjoin defendants O r m
exercising certain authority conferred on the board by Sen
ate Bill No. 26, Laws 1935*

From an order sustaining a

general demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appeals.

Order

confirmed.
FACTS;

It was alleged in the complaint that applica

tions were presented to the Board of University and School
Lands asking it to reduce and scale down accrued and delin
quent interest on certain real estate mortgages, and that
said board was about to and would "accept from debtors of
mortgages securing the payments of Investments of permanent
school funds in this state less than the interest In full
accrued thereon."

#
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QUESTION;
entitled:

Bill No. 26, Laws 1935 (chapter 2$5) is

"An act to provide for the scaling down and dis

counting of past due interest on loans made by the Board of
University and School Lands.”
The sole question is concerned only with whether the
Board of University and School Lands in any case may exer
cise the power which said Senate Bill No. 26 purports to
confer upon said board.

Is Senate Bill No. 26 constitu-

t iona17
RULE: The members of the court agreed that the deci
sion falls within and is controlled by section 89 of the
State Constitution, as amended, which provides "that in no
case shall any legislative enactment or law of the State of
North Dakota be declared unconstitutional unless at least
four of the Judges (of the Supreme Court) shall so decide” ;
and that, consequently, it is the duty of this court to hold
that the statute does not contravene any of the provisions
of the State Constitution invoked by the plaintiff.
DECISION;

Court of Judges holds that Senate Bill No.

26, La%#s 1935* is not vulnerable to any of the attacks made
against it in this action; and that consequently the trial
court was correct in sustaining the demurrer.

The order

appealed from is affirmed.
Key 11.

School system, and establishment or discon

tinuance of schools and local educational institutions in
general.
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(a)
District,

State v. Valiev City Special School

( 1919)

173 N. W. 750, kZ N. D. 14.614.,

Action brenght by the State of North Dakota against
what la termed the Valley ^Ity special school district, to
recover $2,7914-* with Interest, and the cost of this action.
FACTS: There Is located at Valley City a State Nor
mal School, known as the Valley City Normal School; In con
nection therewith and as a part thereof Is operated a model
high, grade, and elementary school, wherein Instrnctlon Is
given to the pupils who attend by the faculty and student
body of the State Normal School.

The State Normal School Is

located In the Valley City special school district of Valley
City,

The pupils who attend the model school reside within

the Valley City special school district.
The state seeks to recover the amount mentioned In
the complaint for the attendance of the number of pupils
for the time stated as set forth In the complaint.
The defendant claims that the Normal Schools of the
state are not part of the public school system.
QUESTION : Was It within the power of the legislature
to Impose on the Valley City special school district a rea
sonable charge for the Instruction and educational facili
ties afforded such pupils by the Normal School through itjs
model high school?

Is the Normal School a part of the free

public school system of North Dakota?

•
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RULE;
thus :

Chapter 142 of the Session Laws of 1915 reads

"That all students attending any model high, graded,

or elementary school vrttlch Is operated, maintained or in any
other manner connected with the State University, any Normal
School, or any other publicly maintained educational insti
tution of higher learning in this state in which model high,
graded, or elementary school, members of the faculty or stu
dent body of such University, Normal School, or institution
of higher learning, teach, there shall be paid by the school
district in which said pupils reside to said Institution as
tuition for such attendance (amount per month stated),.,,"
That the Normal School is part of the free public
school system of North Dakota is set forth in section 148
of the State Constitution.
DECISION ;

Plaint iff*s complaint states good cause of

action.
( b)
Wi lliston.

Batty V . Board of Educat ion of City of
( 1936)

269 N. W. 49 (6? N. D, 6)

From an order sustaining a demurrer to the defend
ant’s answer, the defendants appeal,

Action for an injunc

tion by J , H, Batty,
FACTS : The board of education of the city of Williston is a special school district.,.which in 1931 adopted a
resolution providing that...all high school students who are
residents of Wi H i ston Special School District No, 1 will be
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required te pay $7*50 for each half unit of credit, after
four full yea rsT at tendance of high school. .«(There are ex
ceptions stated uhich are not material and pertinent in the*
instant case and therefore need not be stated.)
Plaintiff's son attended high school for a period of
four full years, but did not complete the course of study
requirements for graduation.

Defendants in their answer

allege that this failure was because of idleness and in
dolence on his part.

Thereafter he sought to continue as a

student in the hig|h school, but the defendants, enforcing
the regulation above set forth, refused him permission to do
so unless and until the tuition charge should be paid.
Thereupon the plaintiff began the action.
The defendants on this appeal insist that the regula
tion is in the interest of discipline, and that the board
was clothed with the authority to make and enforce the regu
lation in question pursuant to section 12^1 , Comp. Laws 1913,
which provides, among other things, that:
"Each board of education shall have the power and it
shall be its dutyt ....
"11.

To adopt, alter and repeal, whenever it may

deem expedient, rules and regulations for the reception,
organization, grading, government and instruction of pupils,
their expulsion, suspension or transfer from one school to
another..."

#

e

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

Ik
RULE;

The public schools••«shall be at all times

equally free, open and accessible to pupils of school age
residing within the district.
DECISION:

Affirmed for plaintiff.

Key 12-13-li*^.
Key 1^.

No cases in North Dakota.

Application to school purposes of school

lands and proceeds thereof.
(a)

State ex rel Board of University and

School Lands v. McMillan.

(1903)

96 N. W. 310

(12 N. D. 280)
This action evolved an extensively written opinion
%rhich may be briefed as follows:

Under the authority of

Chapter 49, P. 54» Laws 1903» bonds on the amount of $60,000
were issued, and the same were purchased by the board of
university and school lands as an investment for the perma
nent fund belonging to the common schools.
RULE:

It was held, on an application to compel the

State Treasurer to pay a warrant for the purchase of said
bonds, that they are void because of the invalidity of the
act authorising their issuance, and for the further reason
that they are not certified to be within the debt limit, as
required by section 18? of the Constitution, and that the
State Treasurer, in refusing to pay said warrant, acted in
accord with his legal duty as the custodian of the trust
fund.
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Key 16.

School fimtfs.
Ho cftsoo liotod for North Dakota.

Key 17.

Creation and sonrcos.
(a)

State y. Stockwell.

For brief, see post Key U 7 » Case (a).
Further ruling in the case pertinent to this Key
section:
Under Session Lavs 1901, c. 85 (Rev. Codes 1905»
sections 8 6 9 -8 7 6 ), fund for clerical assistance to Superin
tendent of Public Instruction in reading teachers' ansirer
papers, held a public fund, for the unexpended balance of
%diich the superintendent is accountable to the state.
Key 18 .

Investment and administration.
(a)

State v. McMi1Ian.

For brief, and ruling, see ante Key 15» Case (a).
(b)

State ex rel. Board of Universitv and

School Lands v. Hanson.

( 1932*.)

256 N. W. 201 (65

N. D. 1)
The ruling in this case, not the facts, is important:
RULE: The State Board of University and School Lands
is authorized to invest permanent school fund of the state
in first mortgages on farm lands in the state.
(c)

State V. Divide County.

(1939)

283

N. W. 161*. (68 N. D. 7 0 8 )
The ruling in this case, not the facts, is important.
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RULE;

A real estate mortgage executed to the state

to secure loan made from the permanent fund conveys no title
to land.

It constitutes a mere pledge of land as security

for the debt* and does not differ in nature from an ordinary
real estate mortgage.

(Lavs 1893» c. 116, section 3; Comp.

Lavs 1 9 1 3 » section 288» as amended by Lavs 1931» c. 23i4-»
Const, section 156.)
( d)

Moses V. Baker.

(19M)

299 N. W, 3 1 $

( 7 1 N. D. 11^.0)

The rule» not the facts» needs be considered here.
RULE:
156.}

(Comp. Lavs 1913» section 281*.; Const, section

The Board of University and School Lands is vested

vith discretion in the performance of directing the invest
ment of the moneys of the permanent school fund.
The board %/as entitled to invest a portion of the
money in the permanent school fund, in buying United States
government bonds at a price greater than par» since the
board may purchase securities for investment at a premium»
if» in the exercise of its discretion» it is deemed proper
to do so.
Kev 1 9 .

Apportionment and disposition.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 20.

Regulation and supervision of schools and

educational institutions in general.
(a)
Williston.

Todd V. Board of ^u c a t i o n of City of
( 1926)

209 N, ¥. 369 (51*. N. D. 235)

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

17
T k i s is an appeal f r o m jadgment of the district court

of Williams CouAty denying iajanctional relief against the
defendant board of education of Williston.

FACTS a

Plaintiff, who resided outside the limits of

the Williston school district, refused to pay required tui
tion in addition to the statutory tuition charges (Ch. 107»
S. L. 1 9 2 1 ) in cases Involving non-resident students.
Plaintiff's two boys attended the Williston H i S c h o o l , but
because father refused to pay required additional tuition,
they were permitted to participate in school classes and
some activities but were not officially enrolled.

School

required additional tuition charges because statutory tui
tion alone did not meet per pupil expenses.

The district

had no accommodations for outside students until a plan was
adopted under which non-resident pupils attending the high
school paid an additional tuition with which the Williston
school district was able to expand facilities.
QUESTION ;

Whether or not the Board of Education of

the Williston city was exercising discrimination in exclud
ing the children of the plaintiff from the high school.
RULE : Non-resident students, pupils from districts
not affording high school facilities must be admitted into
high school when facilities for seating and instruction
shall warrant••.statutory provision as to the amount which
may be charged non-resident pupil admitted into high school

.
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applies only where school already hes f a d l i t i e s . •««where
facilities for seating and Instraction do not warrant ad
mission of non-resident, pupils» hnt provides for» and re
ceives them as a favor» it may Impose tnition charge suffi
cient to meet additional expenses thereby entailed.
DECISION :

It was held that there was no discrimina

tion on the part of the defendants in excluding the children
of the plaintiff from the Williston High School.

Original

judgaent affirmed.
(b)
(66 N. D.

Gerhardt v. Held.
(See Kev 2)
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CREATIGN, ALTERATICM, EXISTENCE, AND
I
DISSOLUTKW OF DISTRICTS
Key 21.

Nature and statas as corporations.
No cases in North Dakota.

Kev 22.

Constitutional and statutory provisions.
(a)

(1910)

School District N o . 9L v. King, et al.

127 N. W. 515 (20 N. D. 6lk)

The Judgment in this case was for the defendants, and
plaintiff appealed.
FACTS; Alleged that the defendants as board of edu
cation made an order attaching to the village of Tower City
for school purposes sections If, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, township
lltO, range 55; that the order was based upon a petition
which was fraudulently presented to the board, and that the
order was void for the reason that the petition was not
signed by a majority of the voters of the territory to be
attached to the village for school purposes; that the
annexed territory is more than three miles from the central
school, and, therefore, requires a two-thirds vote of the
school voters.
RULE:

Section 9i*^9, Rev. Codes 1905, states:

When

any city, town, or village has been organized for school*
purposes, and provided with a board of education under any
general law, or a special act, or under the provisions of

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

20

this articis» territory outside the limits thereof but ad
jacent thereto may be attached to said city, town or village
for school purposes, upon application in writing signed by a
majority of the voters of said adjacent territory; provided
that no territory shall be annexed which is at a greater
distance than three miles from the central school except
upon petition signed by two-thirds of the school voters re
siding in the territory which is a greater distance than the
three miles from the central school *...
DECISlew ;

Judgment was affirmed for the defendants.

The record showed that every requirement of the law was
strictly complied with.

The allegation of the complaint

that the petition was "falsely and fraudulently" presented
to the board of education was not followed by any proof to
substantiate that general allegation.
Laws enacted for the consolidation or division of
school districts are valid as resting solely on legislative
discretion or policy, unless they are contrary to some con
stitutional provision.
(b)
of Wild Rose.

Rosten v. Board of Educat ion of Vi 1l
( 1919)

173 N. W. i|.6l (J4.3 N. D. !^6)

This is an injunctional action to restrain the de
fendant school board from exercising Jurisdiction or author
ity over certain territory which the defendant sought to
annex to the Wild Rose special school district.

Judgment
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for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.
FACTS ;

The board of education gave notice of the

time and place of hearing a petition signed by a majority of
the voters of the territory to be annexed.

Between the time

of filing the petition and the date of the hearing suffi
cient numbers of the signers of the petition had withdrawn,
in writing, their names from the petition and filed such
withdrawals with the clerk of the school district prior to
the time of the hearing, so that the number of the names re
maining on the petition in favor of it, if the withdra%#al of
the names was legal, would leave the petition with less than
a majority of the qualified voters of the territory sought
to be annexed.
RULE ;

Comp. Laws 1913, Ch. I2I4.O (Sess. Laws 1911»

c. 266 section 133)» is an amendment of Rev. Codes» Section
914.
9 » in respect to declaring of II4. days' notice of hearing

before board of education can make an order annexing terri
tory after five days from hearing on petition.
DECISION;

Held» that such petitioners had the right

to withdraw their names from the petition at any time before
the board of education legally made an order annexing the
territory (Section 12I4.O, Comp. Laws 1913).
(c)
of Schools » et al.

Loucks V. Phelps. County Superintend
( 1922)

This action is from a judgment in favor of the
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relator (Loucks), the respondents appealed.

The action

arose oat of an attempt to change the boundaries of an
existing common school district by annexing thereto terri
tory lying in adjacent school districts.
RULE:

Chapter 197» Laws 1919» does not authorize the

creation of a new common school district from an entire
existing common school district and portions of adjacent
common school districts.

In other words, the statute may

not be used for the purpose of annexing territory to an
existing common school district.
DECISION:

Judgment affirmed.

(d)

Jones

Schoo 1 District N o .

ai. v. Briohtwood Independent

^

al.

( 1933)

N. W. 88 I4.

(63 N. D. 275)
In action plaintiffs appealed from a Judgment for
defendants.
Certain warrants were issued for fuel purchased for
school use.

Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from

levying taxes to pay those and other %#arrants and bonds
issued by Brightwood School District on the grounds that in
creased levies then went beyond limits authorized by law.
RULE ;

Warrants Issued in anticipation of tax levies

already made do not augment existing "indebtedness" of
school district within meaning of the Constitution limiting
school district indebtedness (Const. Section 8 3 , as amended
in 1 9 2 0 ).
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Présomption:

That the acts of school officers, done

in the performance of their doty, are legal, and bonds and
warrants authorized by them are valid, the burden of proof
is upon him who asserts to the contrary.
DECISION : Judgment affirmed for defendants.
Key 2 3 .

Creation and organization.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 2i|. (1).

In general.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key 2k (2).
(a)

Attacking legality of organization.
Weiderholt v* Lisbon Special School

District No. 19.

(1918)

169 N. W. 809 (l*.l N.D. li+ô)

FACTS : This action was brought to enjoin the defend
ants from asserting any Jurisdiction over certain territory
that had been annexed to the defendant school district, or
from levying upon or carrying forward upon the books of de
fendant school district any taxes for the benefit of the
district or certifying the same to the county auditor.
Judgment was also asked against the school district for an
amount paid in taxes during the year preceding the bringing
of the action.

Plaintiffs contend that the annexation pro

ceedings were void for the reasons, chiefly:

(a) that the

application therefor was not signed by the requisite number
of qualified petitioners; (b) that the application was
signed by some who were not residents or voters of the
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territory sought to be annexed; (c) that proper notice of
the hearing of the application was not given; (d) that,
after the application was signed by all the petitioners ex
cept two, it was altered by one of the individual defend
ants, a member of the defendant school board, by the addi
tion of descriptions embracing additional territory..,.
RULE; A complaint which alleges nonexistence of
facts required to give the school board authority to enlarge
the district states a cause of action.
DECISION :

Judgment reversed in favor of plaintiffs.

( b)

Bi1lings School Pi sir let v, Loma

Special School Dlst.

(1928)

219 N. W. 3 3 6 (56

N. D. 7 5 1 )
FACTS :

The controversy involved in this appeal by

plaintiffs and intervener (Storlie School District) grew out
of the organization of Loma Special School District in Cava
lier County.

Certain territory within the boundaries of the

plaintiff Billings School District was included within the
boundaries of the Loma district, and the Billings district
institutes this action to enjoin the defendant school dis
trict and all connected officials from levying or assessing
taxes or exercising any control over, or carrying on any
functions whatsoever in said territory, or in any manner
treating the same as a part of the defendant Loma Special
School District.

There was also included in the Loma
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district certain territory formerly within Storlie School
District, and the latter asked for and was given leave to
intervene in the action.
RULE;

(1)

In school district's suit to enjoin levy

ing or assessing taxes in territory detached to form special
school district, attack on incorporation of village organ
ized as special school district is collateral and not avail
able to plaintiff (Comp. Laws 1913» section 12l|.3).
(2)

The legality of proceedings of a school board in

re-forming a district by adding territory thereto, which
could have been tested at the common law, may be tested in
this state by a civil action in the district court under
section 7969 of the Compiled Laws of 1913*
DECISION ;
Key 25-

Judgment affirmed for defendants.

Independent and other districts in incor

porated cities, towns, and villages.
(a)

Bi 1 lings School District v, Loma

Sp ed al Schoo 1 Dist.
For brief, see case immediately preceding.
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this K e y
section, as follows:

Incorporated village constituting part of three com
mon school districts may be organized as special school
district (Comp. Laws 1913» section 12I4.3 ).
Key 2 6 .

Rural independent districts and other

«
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special organisations.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 2 7 .

Proceedings for organization.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 28.

De facto districts.
State V. Ferguson.

( 1912)

131^. N, W, 872

( 2 3 N. D. 1 5 3 )

Case not pertinent.
Key 2 9 .

Application narrow.

Unorganized territory.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 3 0 .

Territorial extent and boundaries.
(a)

Weeks v. Hetland et al. ( 1925)

of Fargo et al Interveners)

(City

202 N. W. 807 (52 N. D. 3 5 D

In this action the plaintiffs sought to restrain the
defendants, purporting to act as officers of school district
No. 9 6 of Cass County, from entering and carrying out
certain contracts and generally from functioning as officers
of that district.
FACTS;

Under the provisions of the legislative act

creating the Fargo school district, providing that the title
to all property of the Fargo school district shall be in the
city of Fargo for the use and benefit of such district, and
vesting in the board of education thereof authority to ad
minister the affairs of the district and control over the
property and funds of such district, it is held that both
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t.lie city of Fargo and the board of education have sufficient
interest in a legal controversy begun as a taxpayer's suit
and involving funds to which the district makes a claim» to
warrant intervention as parties therein.
RULE;

School district composed of Incorporated city

alone is considered enlarged to include contiguous territory
annexed to the city.
DECISIGN : Judgment affirmed for plaintiffs.
Key 3 1 .

Alteration and creation of new districts.

Constitutional and statutory provisions, see ante
Key 22.
Key 3 2 .

Change of boundaries.
(a)

School District N o . 9k v. Thompson.

(1911*.)

li+6 N. W, 727 ( 2 7 N. D. 1*.59)

FACTS;

Plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendants, as

officers of a special school district, from annexing cer
tain adjacent territory to such district for school purposes,
under section 133, c. 266, Laws 1911, alleging as grounds
for such relief that the school district had unlawfully in
curred an indebtedness exceeding the constitutional debt
limit ; also that the petition for such annexation was not
signed by qualified school voters in such adjacent territory.
RULE: That a special school district had unlawfully
incurred a debt exceeding the constitutional limit held
immaterial and not ground for enjoining the officers of a
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special school district from annexing certain adjacent ter
ritory under Laws 1911» c . 266, section 133*
DECISION;

Plaintiff's petition denied.

( b)

Weiderholt v. Lisbon Special School

Dist. No. 19.
For brief see ante hey 2 I4. (2), Case (a).
Further ruling in this case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
Where a school board entered an order of annexation
under Comp. Laws 1913» section 12i|0, all parties acquiescing
for nine months, and thereafter a signer of the petition and
another sued to set aside the order and recover taxes paid,
and asserted that plaintiffs, without sufficient excuse,
delayed the prosecution so that a demurrer was not disposed
of for more than a year and a half, and a trial was not had
for more than three years, and in the meantime the assets
and liabilities between the school districts had been
settled, plaintiffs held to have been guilty of such laches
as to preclude them from asserting the invalidity of the
annexation proceedings.
(c)

Loucks v. Phelps.

For brief, see ante Key 22, Case (a).
Purther ruling in this case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
In view of Laws 1917» c. 213* amending Comp. Laws
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1913» section III4.6 , held that Laws 1919, c. 197, docs not
authorize the creation of a new conmon school district frcan
an entire existing common school district and portions of
adjacent common school districts.
Key 33*

Consolidation, and union districts.

Proceedings for consolidation, see post Key 37.
Review of proceedings, see post Key 39.
Key 3ii-.

Division.
Plummer et a 1 v. Borsheim. County

(a)
Superintendent.
FACTS;

( 1Ô99)

80 N. W. 690 ( 8 N. D. 565)

In this action the residents outside in the

township outside the city of Hillsboro, population more than
8 0 0 , undertook to organize a separate school township.

A

petition was presented to the county superintendent of
schools, and he was about to call an election, when this
action was brought, setting forth the facts, and claiming
that the procedure was unconstitutional, and praying that
the defendant, county superintendent, be perpetually en
joined from calling such election.
RULE; The word "city," as used in Laws 1899, c. 114.3 ,
section 1, providing that in any school township containing
a city of 800 inhabitants or more, and which is not organ
ized as an independent school district, the residents in
said school township outside the city limits may separate
themselves from the city, and organize a distinct school
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township, does not include incorporated towns or villages.
(Hillsboro was not organized as an independent school dis
trict.)
DECISION ;

Judgment reversed in favor of plaintiffs.

(b)

Tal Imadqe v . Walker.

( 1916)

159 N, W.

71 ( 3i4- N. D. 590)
FACTS ; This is an action to inquire into the valid
ity of certain proceedings whereby an alleged new school
district was organized out of a portion of an old district,
and to inquire into the right of certain of the defendants
to exercise the rights, duties, etc., pertaining to such
offices.

The holding in this case is important.

RULE :

Under Comp. Laws 1913» section lll^.?» author

izing the organization of new school districts, a special
board composed of the board of county commissioners and
county superintendent may organize new school districts
from a portion of an old one or more.
Key 35*

Change of organization to or from independ

ent district.
(a)

State ex re 1. Laird v. Gang.

( 1901)

8? N. W. 5 ( 10 N. 0. 331)
FACTS : The record of facts presents a great mass of
objections, exceptions, and so-called "assignments of er
ror.”

Briefly, the plaintiffs took this action to compel

the defendant, county superintendent of schools, to call an
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election in Greenfield township for the purpose of electing
school officers on the premiss that the township was a civil
township, although it had never been allegedly legally or
ganized into a civil toimship, nor had it become a distinct
school corporation.

Further, Greenfield civil township had

never been segregated from the school township %Aich was
known as "New City Township."
RULE ; Upon the organization into a civil township of
a portion of the territory comprising a school township cor
poration, held construing sections 6 $8 , 6 $9, Rev. Codes,
that such a civil township continues for school purposes as
a part of such school township corporation until segregated
therefrom by the commissioners and county superintendent of
schools, upon petition of voters.
DECISION ;
Key 3 6 .

Reversed in favor of defendant.

Powers of boards or officers, and of courts.
{ a)

Larson.
FACTS;

Bloomington School Di strict N o . 17 v.

( 1926)

207 N. W. 650 ( 53 N. D. 59 I4.)

In this action a petition for the organiza

tion of a proposed school district came on to be heard be
fore the board of county commissioners and the county super
intendent of schools, pursuant to notice duly given, on July
15 * 1925-

A number of persons residing within the Bloom

field and St. Anna school districts filed protests against
the granting of the petition.

Portions of those districts
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were to have been Included in the organisation of a common
school district from portions of three then existing common
school districts.

After a full hearing, an order was

entered granting the petition for the organisation of the
new proposed district.

This action was then brought by the

pla int iffs•
RULE ;

Power of commissioners and superintendent to

organise new school district from another, or from portions
of one already organised on petition of voters in proposed
district is to be exercised conformably and is subject only
to act 1 9 1 7 * relating to changing commonschool
boundaries (Laws 1919, c. 197;

district

Comp. Laws 1913» section

111|.8; Laws 1917» c. 213).
Key 37*

Proceedings in general.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 37 (2).
(a)

Meetings and mode of action in general.
McDona 1d v, Hanson.

( 1917)

I6 i4_ N. W.

8 (37 N. D. 324)
FACTS ;

Plaintiffs brought this action to restrain

defendants from organising a new school district out of a
certain township.

Plaintiffs arc residents and taxpayers

of the original school district Caledonia, which embraced
the civil township of Hershberg.

The petition for the

organization of the new school district was filed with the
county superintendent on May 6 , 19 1 6 , was in legal form.
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and contained more than three-fourths of all the legal
school voters then residing in the territory which the
petitioners wished to have created into a new school dis
trict . Notice of the hearing of such petition was given by
the county superintendent; and the notice stated that a
hearing would be held in the courthouse on Wednesday,
July 19, A. D. 1 9 1 6 , at 2 o ’clock p.m.

The plaintiffs con

tend that there was no legal notice of said hearing pub
lished, and that the July meeting of the board of county
commissioners was on the third day of July.
contentions are pertinent
RULE;

Chapter 135

Additional

to the holding in the case.
of the Session Laws of 1915 held

to provide two methods of organizing new common school dis
tricts ;
(a)

The first method is by presenting to the board

of county commissioners and county superintendent a petition
containing proper and legal requirements as to assessed
valuation and extent of the territory to be contained in the
new district to be organized, signed by a majority of the
school voters in the districts whose boundaries will be
affected by the organization of the new school district, and
by at

least three-fourths of the residents of the territory

to be

included in the new school district.

Such petition
*

must be heard upon 30 days’ notice, as provided by section
lllj.8 . Comp. Laws 1913, and only at the July meeting of the
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board of county commissioners, as provided by section III4.7 ,
Comp. Laws 1913.
(b)

The second method of organizing a new common

school district Is by petition signed by three-fourths of
the school voters residing in the territory to be organized
Into the new school district, such petition to comply with
the requirements of law as to assessed valuation and extent
of territory In both the old and the new districts.

The

notice required by section 1114.8 of the Compiled Laws of
1913 shall also be given, but such petition may be acted

upon at the July meeting or any other meeting of the board
of county commissioners conjointly with the county superin
tendent of schools.
In this case, the court ruled that Comp. Laws 1913,
section III4.7 , as to time of hearing on petition for organi
zation of new school districts, applies only to the first
method of organization prescribed by Laws 191^, c. 135DEClSION ;

Judgment was affirmed for defendants.

(b)

Anderson v. Peterson.

( 1952 )

5^4- M. W.

2d 5U2 ( 7 8 N. D. 514.1 )
FACTS ;

This is a suit brought by the plaintiffs as

property owners, electors, school patrons, and taxpayers of
a certain school district.

They allege many irregularities

in the reorganization of another school district, particu
larly the inclusion of their own district.

They also
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contend that the "Act to provide for the reorganization of
school districts," Chapter 15-53, 1949 Supplement, NDRC 1943
is unconstitutiona1 , and to have declared null and void pro
ceedings leading up to school district reorganization.

The

record of facts presents a great mass of objections, excep
tions, and so-called "assignments of error."
RULE;

(1)

Provision of school district reorganiza

tion act that each county committee shall conduct such pub
lic hearings and hold such public meetings at such specified
places throughout county as it may deem necessary to explain
and acquaint people with provisions of act, manifests intent
that only such hearings or meetings shall be held as the
committee deems necessary to furnish to people with informa
tion regarding the law, and word "shall" must be construed
as permissive when considered with balance of provision.
(NDRC 1949, Supp. 15-5310)
(2)

In suit by school patrons to have school distr

reorganization proceedings declared null and void, wherein
it was contended that county committee had abused its dis
cretion in failing to call meetings in manner provided by
statute for purpose of acquainting people with provisions
of reorganization act, record established that meetings
which were held were sufficient to acquaint people with act
•

and that committee was Justified In proceeding to call meet
ing for hearing on proposal for reorganization without
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holding further hearings for purpose of discussion of law.
(NDRC 1949, Supp. 15-5301, 15-5310, 15-5313)
(3)

County committee on school district's reorgani

zation which attempted to ascertain wishes of patrons of re
spective districts by appointment of committee for each dis
trict to ascertain sentiment, and by holding of meeting to
enable members of districts to decide whether they wished to
be part of new district, did not act arbitrarily, discrimin
ator ily, or in violation of the law when particular school
district was included after failure of any of patrons from
such district to register vote against participation.
DECISION ;

Judgment reversed in favor of defendants.

Key 37 (3).
(a)

Petition or consent.
Schoo1 Di strict No. 94 v. Thompson.

For brief, see ante Key 32, Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
(1)

A petition for the annexation of territory ad

jacent to a special school district, under Laws 1911, c . 266,
section 1 3 3 , need not set forth all the facts the existence
of which are essential to authorize annexation.
(2)

That petitioners for annexation of territory ad

jacent to a special school district, were not owners of the
real property sought to be annexed, and that they contem
plated removal from such land, held not to disqualify them
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from acting vAile voters in stich territory,

(Laws 1911,

c. 266, section 133.)
(b)

Tallmadge v, Weber.

For brief, see Key 3k-» Case (b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this hey
section, as follows:
Where under a petition for two new school districts,
under Comp. Laws 1913» section lllf.?, the board of county
commissioners and county superintendant, pursuant to notice,
proceed to organize two distinct new districts, the proceed
ings were not a nullity, and were, at most, merely irregu
lar, so that directors of the original school district could
not complain.
(c)

McDonald v. Hans on.

For brief, see ante Key 37 (2), Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section, as
follows :
Laws 191 5 » c. 135 » held to provide method of organ
izing new school districts by petition to county commission
ers signed by majority of voters in districts whose bounda
ries would be affected, and also by petition signed by
three-fourths of voters in territory to be organized into
new district, and both petitions must comply with Comp. Laws
1913 , section lll|.d.
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( d)

Rostcn V , Board of Education of Vi liage

of WiId Rose»
For brief, see ante Key 22, Case (b).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section, as
follows :
Where special school district sought to annex certain
territory and petition signed by majority of voters of ter
ritory to be annexed was filed with district board of educa
tion, which gave notice of time and place of hearing, part
of signers of petition then had a legal right to withdraw
their names frcm. the petition any time before board's legal
order annexing such territory.

(Ccnp. Laws 1913, sect.

12k0.)

(e)

State v, Stevens.

( 1921)

183 N. W.

(14.8 N. D. 14.7)
This case is governed by the principle contained in
Rosten v. Board of Education immediately preceding.
(f)

State V. Laman.

( 19214.)

20 I4. N. W. 8 I4.5

(52 N. D. 60)
QUESTION:

Where the proposed new school district

embraces territory wholly within a given county, but some
of which is taken from a school district \^ich lies within
two counties, may the petition for such proposal be heard
by the county commissioners and the county superintendent
of the county within which the proposed new district would
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lie, or must it be heard by the county commissioners and the
county superintendents of the two counties wherein one of
the original districts lies?

The facts in this case gave

rise to that question.
RULE :

Under Comp. Laws 1913, section lli|.7, as

amended by Sess. Laws 1919, c. 197, petition proposing or
ganization of new school district from territory previously
embraced within school district lying within two or more
adjoining counties, must be presented for concurrent action
to boards of county commissioners and county superintendents
of counties within which original district was embraced,
they being "affected" within meaning of statute, in view of
section 13 2 7 , and following provisions requiring representa
tion by each district in adjusting assets and liabilities.
Key 37

Notice.
(a)

School District N o . 9li v. Thompson.

For brief, see ante Key 32, Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section follows:
Notice of hearing of petition for the annexation of
territory to a school district is sufficiently given when
published once in the nearest newspaper II4. days prior to
the hearing, and posted in the manner prescribed by such
section.
Key 37 (5).

Records, orders, and reports.
No cases in North Dakota.

*
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Key 38.

Submission of question to popular vote,
(a)

Iverson v. Williams School District.

For brief, see post Key 68, Case (c).
Further ruling pertinent to this section follows:
Comp. Laws 1913, sections llBJ^, 118$, and 1190, and
Laws 1 9 1 5 # c. 1 2 7 * authorize the question of consolidation
of schools to be determined exclusively by the voters in the
common school districts.
Key 39.

Review of proceedings.

The following cases were tried, but they are not sig
nificant, nor are they pertinent to this compilation,
(a)

State v . Thurs by-Butte S p e d a 1 School

Dist. No. 37 in McHenry County.

( 1920) 178 N. W. 787

ih^ N. D. $55)
( b)

State V. Strauss.

( 1922)

187 N. W.

9 6 )4. (1#.8 N. D. 9 2 7 )

Key 14.0 .

Operation and effect.
(a)

State v. Gang.

For brief, see ante Key 35* Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section follows:
Rev. Codes, section 6$8, provides that each civil
township in every county not organized for school purposes
at the taking effect of the act shall constitute a district
school corporation, and Whenever a civil township Is there
after organized it shall constitute a district school
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corporation, except as otherwise provided; and section 659
provides that each school township in every county consist
ing of territory not organized into a civil township shall
remain a district corporation, and that, whenever such school
township shall be organized into or annexed to a civil town
ship, such civil township shall constitute a district school
corporation, but that the act shall not be construed to
alter the boundary lines of any school township previously
organized, except on petition as thereinafter provided.
Held that, on the organization into a civil township of a
portion of the territory comprising a school township cor
poration, such civil township continues for school purposes
as a part of such school township corporation unti 1 segre
gated therefrom by the commissioners and county superintend
ent of schools on petition of the voters.
(b)
M.'

(1912)

Farley v. Lawton School Di strict N o .
137 N. W. 821 (23 N, D. 565)

FACTS : This is an action in which the plaintiff
seeks to recover salary as a school teacher under a contract
made with the school board of Homer school district.

Prior

to the date of such contract, the territory in which such
school was located was duly segregated from Homer school
district and organized into a separate and distinct school
#

corporation, known as Lawton school district No, !^l, the
defendant, although the school officials for such new

•

•
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district were not elected and did not qualify unti 1 later.
RULE!

Where county commissioners and county super

intendent of schools « under Rev. Codes 1905» sections 786,
792, 791*.» 7 9 6 , segregated some territory from a school dis
trict and created a new one, and the school board of the old
district ceased to possess any authority over the schools in
such new district,

the contract by such school board with a

teacher in the new

district was of no effect.

Key l*.l.

Adjustment of pre-existing rights and

liabilities•
Key l*.l (1).
(a)
District V .

Property and funds.
State ex rel« Reynolds Specia1 School
School District N o . 21. ( 1697 ) 71 N.

W.

772 ( 6 N. D. 14.86)
FACTS : This is an action in which a school district
was divided, by the organization of a city or incorporated
town or village situated within said district, into a
special school district.

The schoolhouse that had original

ly belonged to and been used by school district No. 21, de
fendants, remained in that district, being situated outside
the limits of the incorporated town.

After the organization

of the Reynolds special school district, an effort was made
to effect an equalization as contemplated by Laws I89 O,
c. 6 2 , section 190.

To that end, said special school dis

trict appointed an arbitrator, and that portion of the old

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

1^3

school district No* 21 outside the special district, and
which, of course, still constituted school district No. 21,
appointed the county superintendent and two defendant arbi
trators .

The arbitrators proceeded to apportion the money

on hand, and the uncollected taxes, and the outstanding in
debtedness of the original district; but the defendant arbi
trators refused to in any manner consider the schoolhouse
and furniture as exclusive property of school district No.
21.

Thereupon this action was brought by the special school

district against the original school district No* 21, and
against the defendant arbitrators, to compel an adjustment
of the rights and claims of the respective districts to the
said schoolhouse and furniture.
RULE; Where a school district is divided, by the
organization of a city or incorporated town or village
situated within said district, into a special school dis
trict, under the provisions of chapter 62, Laws 1890, the
board of arbitration provided for by said chapter to equal
ize the interests of said districts must take into consider
ation the school building owned by the original district,
and adjust the rights of the respective districts concerning
the same.
DECISION : Reversed in favor of plaintiffs.
m

{ b)

State V. Tucker.

For brief, see post Key 57# Case (a).
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Further ruling pertinent to this Key section follows:
Uncollected taxes should be taken into account under
Comp. Laws 1913, section 1328, in case of annexation by one
school district of part of another.
Key Li (2).
(a)

Liabilities.
Coler v. Dwiqht Schoo1 Township.

( 1893)

55 N. W. 587 (3 N. D. 21+9)

28 L. R. A, 61+9

FACTS :

The county superintendent of schools, under

chapter li+. Laws 18?9, organized a school district.

School

district officers were elected, and exercised the functions
of their respective offices; teachers were employed by the
district and school was taught, and a school meeting was
held in the district to vote upon the question of issuing
bonds to build a schoolhouse.
issued.

Such bonds were thereafter

In an action upon some of the interest coupons of

such bonds, held that the district was a de facto municipal
corporation, and that therefore the defense could not be
interposed that the bonds were void on the ground that the
district had no legal existence because of failure to comply
with certain provisions of the statute regulating the organizat ion of districts in matters which went to the jurisdic
tion of the county superintendent to organize the district.
RULE;

A school township organized under Laws I8 8 3 ,

c . 1+1+, becomes, immediately upon such organization, liable
for the debts of a district, and the schoolhouse and
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furniture become the property of the township.

And this

liability is complete, and does not depend upon the settle
ment of equities between several districts included in the
new school township, under Laws IÔ8 3 , c.
138

sections 136 -

.
(b)

Coler v. Coppin.

( 1901)

85 N. W. 9 8 8

(10 N. D. 66)
For brief, see case immediately preceding.
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section follows:
A school township organized under Laws I8 8 3 , c.
became by such organization liable for the debts of the old
districts whose territory was included in such townships.
(c)

State V. Rasmusson.

For brief, see post Key 100, Case (a).
Further rule pertinent to this Key section follows:
The rights of purchasers of bonds of school districts
are subject to statutory provisions in effect at the time of
the issuance of the bonds, relating to detachment of terri
tory from school districts, organization of new school dis
tricts, and the equalization of property, funds on hand, and
debts between school districts which have been affected by a
change in boundaries.
1328

(Comp. Laws 1913# sections IH 4.7 , I327,

, 1 3 3 6 .)
Key ill ( 3).

m

Proceedings for apportionment of assets

and liabilities.
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(a)

State ex rel. Reynolds Special School

Di strict V. School District N o . 2 1 .
For briefj see ante Key ii.1 (1), Case (a).

Same rule

applies herein.
(b)

School Di strict N o . 9k v. Special

School Dist. No.

( 1916)

157 N. W. 28? (33 N. D.

353)
FACTS;

Two school districts of Cass County changed

their boundaries.

Arbitrators were appointed to equalize

the property and debts.
the sum of $239.8?.

Their decision gave to plaintiff

The defendant then and ever since has

refused to pay that sum to the plaintiff.

It was held that

the plaintiff had no cause of action, based on Ccmp. Laws
1913, sections 1327, 1331.
RULE ; Arbitration to equalize property and debts of
school districts on change of boundaries resulting in a%fard
of specific sum to one district was pursuant to Laws cited
in above paragraph,
make

which provide that the arbitrators shall

areturnof their findings to the county auditor,

who

shall thereupon extend a tax against the property situated
within the districts to pay the various awards, and that the
same shall be paid as taxes are collected.
Key k2.

Formation of districts and annexation and

detachment of territory for special purposes.
Key k2 ( 1).

In general.
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(a)

Greenfield School District v. H a n n a f ord

Special School District.

(1910)

127 N. W. U99 (20

N. D, 393)
FACTS and HOLDING;

Where the board of education of a

special school district under Rev. Codes 1905» section 9U9,
annexed adjacent territory, and a division of the funds and
property was made after annexation, and no objection was
made to such annexation for more than two years, and at a
meeting for the purpose of dividing the property and obliga
tions of the territory divided no protest was filed, and an
arbitration agreement was entered into, and the school dis
trict thus created levied school taxes on all its property,
and bonds were voted for the erection of a new schoolhouse,
which was thereafter erected, and taxes were levied and col
lected under the new conditions, held that the plaintiffs
are estopped from questioning the validity of proceedings of
the board of education in annexing adjacent territory,
{b)
et. aj,.

(1921)

State ex rel. Nicholson v. Ferguson
13k N. W. 8?2 (23 N. D. 153)

FACTS ! This is an action in which the voters in a
civil township comprising a portion of a special school dis
trict petitioned the board of county commissioners and the
county superintendent of schools to have the township set
#

off into a separate school district.
RULE:

Under Rev. Codes 1905, section 914-9 , voters in
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the civil township were not entitled to the relief prayed
for.

The section provides :

"That the county ccxnmissi oners

shall detach any part of such adjacent territory which is at
a greater distance than three miles from the central school
in such special district and attach any adjacent school or
special school district or districts upon petition to do so,
signed by three-fourths of the legal voters of such adjacent
territory,"
(c)

Sorenson v, Tobiason.

(1922)

l88

N. W. I4.I (1+8 N. D. 921+)
FACTS ;

This is an action in which the board of

county commissioners and the county superintendent detached
from a special school district territory lying within three
miles of the central school.

The action is from a Judgment

against the defendant officers, and they appeal.
RULE;

Laws 1919, c. 197» construed in its relation

to Comp. Laws 1913» section 121+0, and Laws 1919» c. 196,
amending section 111+7 , governing the territory embraced in
special school districts and providing for attaching and
detaching territory, do not authorize detachment of terri
tory within three miles of the central school. In view of
Rev, Codes 1905, section 781+ et seq, (Comp. Laws 1913,
sections 1 2 2 9 , 121+0 ),
DECISION ;

Affirmed for plaintiffs,

(d)

Harrison School District N o , 2_ v, City
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of Ml not «
FACTS;

189 N. W. 338 <1^.8 N. D. II8 9 )

( 1922)

This action was brought to restrain the board

of education of the city of Minot from levying taxes and
from exercising any Jurisdiction over certain territory de
scribed in the complaint.

The ultimate question presented

is whether the territory In dispute is a part of Minot
special school district and under the Jurisdiction of the
board of education of that city, or whether such territory
is a part of the plaintiff school district and under the
Jurisdiction of its officers.

Prior to the year 1909# a

large portion of the northwest section of the city of Minot
had a separate legal existence and was commonly designated
as "North Minot."

North Minot was in fact embraced within,

and a portion of, an organised township known as Harrison
Township (plaintiff).
the city of Minot.

In 1909 North Minot was annexed to

The question arises:

Did the extension

of the limits of the city of Minot also extend the limits
of the Minot special school district No. 1, and make the
territory so attached to the city a part of such special
school district?
RULE;

(1)

Under Corap. Laws 1913# sections 1229,

1 2 3 0 # 12i4.0 , 12kl, 12W#

12S1# 12514# 1260, 1261, and in view

of the legislative history thereof, a special school dis•

trict can be organized only from a platted or incorporated
city, town, or village, or fr<wn such city, town or village
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and territory contiguous thereto.
(2)

Where an incorporated city is organized into a

special school district, all the territory within the city
must be included within the special school district.
(3)

Where a special school district is composed of

an incorporated city alone, and the city limits are extended
by the annexation of contiguous territory to the city, the
special school district is enlarged so as to include the
territory annexed to the city.
DECISION ;

Judgment for defendants affirmed.

(e )

Common School Dis trlet N o . 126 of Cass

Co%mtv V, City of Fargo.

( 1952)

51 N. W. 2d 36i|.

(78 N. D. 583)
In addition to the rules and holdings in the case
immediately preceding (Harrison School Pis trict No. 2 v.
City of ^argo). the following prevailed:
Where city organized as special school district
annexed territory under statutes relating to annexation of
territory by cities, the territory annexed automatically
became part of the special school district of the city, re
gardless of the limitation of the statute prohibiting de
tachment from one school district for annexation to special
district if part of original district remaining after pro
posed annexation would have assessed valuation of less than
$100,000 for each teacher employed in remaining territory
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or less than $12S*000 for each teacher employed in remaining
territory, if remaining territory had graded or consolidated
school with two or more teachers.

(NDRC 1914-3, 15-2701 ct

seq., 15-2716, i#-0-5l01 et seq.)
Key I42 (2).

High school and graded school districts.

(a)

Olson V. CoalfieId School District

N o . 16 of Divide County.

( 1926)

208 N. W. 1514-

(53 N. D. 575)
FACTS: This is an action brought to challenge the
establishment of a Joint high school district pursuant to
the provisions of sections 1192, 1193» and 11914-» Comp. Laws
1913.

Briefly, the voters in three school districts (one a

special district, and two common school districts) voted in
favor of establishing the proposed Joint district high
school.

The plaintiffs, as ground for challenge, two propo

sitions from which only the following need be noted:

that

the statute under which the proposed establishment of

a

Joint district high school was pursued contemplates that a
district high school may be established only in common
school districts, and that one of the school districts in
volved in this proposal is a special high school district.
There was no controversy as to the essential and controlling
matters of fact in the case.

The district court held for
•

the defendants.
RULE:

(1)

Provisions of statutes relating to

«
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establishment of district high schools or graded schools or
both held to apply only to common school districts, and not
to special school districts, and special school district
cannot Join with common school districts in election to es
tablish district high school.

(C. L. 1913, sec. 1151» 1192,

1194, 1229, 1245)
(2)

Election of special school district and two com

mon school districts to establish Joint school district can
not authorize establishment of Joint high school by the two
common school districts only.

(Comp. Laws 1913, sections

1151, 1192, 1194, 1229, 1245)
(3)

Where two or more school districts Join to es

tablish and maintain district high school, no one of such
districts need possess qualifications required by statute as
to school population and number of schools contained there
in, but it is sufficient if all districts taken together
possess such qualifications.

(See citations in above para

graphs .)
DECISION ;

Judgment reversed in favor of plaintiffs.

(b )

Olson et al v . Coalfield School Pis-

trict N o . 16 of Divi de County.

( 1926)

210 N. W. l80

(54 N. D. 657)
(See case immediately preceding.)
FACTS ;

At the time the hearing was held in the case

immediately preceding, the Joint high school district, with
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a school at Noonan, was already in full operation.

The

court in the above case reversed Judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, and allowed that the organization of the school .
district was Irregular and illegal.
did not bring the action soon enough.

However, the plaintiffs
And in this action

they sought to restrain and enjoin the Coalfield school dis
trict No. 16, Brown school district No, 1^.0, and the board of
education of the special school district (village of Kermit)
from in any manner proceeding to further organize, operate
or continue a high school known as the Noonan district high
school.
RULE;

When high school is organized, taxes levied,

buildings constructed, teachers employed, and school con
ducted for nine months, acquiescence for such period estops
objectors to question regularity of organization proceedings.
Key 14.3 .

Enumeration of children for school purposes.
No cases in North Dakota.

kk-»

Dissolution.

No cases in North Dakota.

«

•
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CHAPTER V
GOVERNMENT, OFFICERS, AND DISTRICT MEETINGS
Key i^.5*

Administration of school affairs in general.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 1^,6.

Constitutional and statutory provisions.
(a)

State ex rel. Langer. Atty. Gen.. et al

V. Totten et al.
FACTS ;

(1919)

175 N. W, 563 (

N. D. 557)

This is an original application to this

supreme court to compel the board of administration and the
educational commission to refrain from preparing and pre
scribing the courses of study for the common school of the
state.
(For brief and rule. see post Key 161|., Case (a).)
(b)
School Clerk.

State ex rel. Agneberg v. Peterson,
( 192l|.)

201 N. W. 856 (52 N. D. 120)

The sole question presented on this appeal is whether
the office of school treasurer in a special school district,
lying partly without an incorporated village, is elective or
appointive.
RULE ;

Laws 1913# c . 256, providing for appointment

of clerk and treasurer of special school district, repeals
Laws 1911, c. 266, section lif.7, providing that treasurer of
city, etc., comprising special district, shall be treasurer
of board of education, and that in certain cases such
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officer should be elected.
(c)

Batty V. Board of Education of City

Wi 111 Ston.
For brief, see ante Key 11, Case (b).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section follows;
Statute authorizing school board to adopt and enforce
rules and regulations for conduct of schools must be consid
ered in light of legislative policy that public schools
shall be equally free, open, and accessible to all children
over six and under twenty-one years of age in district
wherein schools are maintained (Ccmp. Laws 1913* sections
1251» subsec. 11, 1314.35 Const, section II4.7 et seq.).
Key I4.7 .

State boards and officers.
(a)

struction.
FACTS :

State v . Stockwe11. Supt. Public In
(1912)

134 N. W. 767 (23 N. D. 70)

During the three terms that the defendant

held the office as Superintendent of Public Instruction
certain moneys came into his possession regularly by virtue
of his office.

A certain amount of these unexpended moneys

were retained by him, and accounted for, personally by him
after the expiration of his term, under his claim in good
faith that he was entitled to retain same as owner thereof;
and that acting thereon to determine the law involved this
#

action was brought.
RULE:

(1)

•

Legislature, in giving the State Super-

•
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intendent of Public Instruction authority to disburse fund
for clerical assistance for reading teachers' answer papers,
held not to constitute him the owner of the fund.
(2)

Burden of establishing title to fund collected

under Sess. Laws 1901, c. 85 (Rev. Codes 1905» sections
869-876),

in State Superintendent of Public Instruction

individually he Id to be upon him, and not on the state to
establish want of ownership on his part.
(3)

Under Rev. Codes 1905» sections 101, k20, 14-2 1 ,

formerly Rev. Codes 1895» sections 98, 357» 358, and Rev.
Codes 1 9 0 5 , section 103» Superintendent of Public Instruct ion he Id required to account not later than expiration of
each term of office for unexpended balance of fund created
by Sess. Laws 1901, c. 85 (Rev. Codes 105» sections 869876).

(b)

McDonaId v, Nielsen.

For brief, see post Key I3 0 , Case (a).
Same rule appertains to this section.
Key I4.8 .

County boards and officers.

Appeal from proceedings for creation of independent
district, see ante K e y 27.
Powers relative to division of districts, see ante
Key 36.
Key ifS ( 1).

Appointment or election.

No cases in North Dakota.
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Ke^r 1^8 (2).

Eligibility and qualification.

(a)

Wendt v. Waller.

( 1920)

1?6 N. W. 930

(1|.6 N. D. 268)
FACTS and HOLDING; The defendant is holder of a pro
fessional certificate of the second grade which plaintiffs
contend he received fraudulently.
their contention is correct.

There is no proof that

This proceeding was brought by

plaintiffs to determine title to the office of county super
intendent of schools to which the defendant had been elected
in Ward county.

It was held:

"The Legislature having im

posed upon the superintendent of public instruction the
duties of determining the existence of the necessary quali
fications for a second grade professional certificate and of
revoking those improperly issued, a review of such determi
nation by court, except for fraud, or an original attempt to
impeach a certificate in a judicial proceeding, involves a
collateral attack on the certificate.
DECISION : Judgment for defendant affirmed.
Key 1+8 (3).

Term of office, vacancies, and holding

over.
(a)

Bickford v. Fa brick. ( 190?)

112 N, W.

71+ ( 16 N. D. 91+)
Inasmuch as this case does not strictly pertain to

#

the study of schools and school districts, only statute is
set forth:

#

•
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Under Rev. Codes 1899, section 6 3 8 , and Rev. Codes
190 5 , section 76!*., providing that the term of office of a

county superintendent of schools shall be two years, com
mencing on the first Monday in January after his election,
and until his successor is elected and qualifies, a duly
elected and qualified acting county superintendent continues
as such until his successor is elected and qualifies.
( b)

J enness v. Clark.

357 (21 N. D. 1 5 0 )

( 1910)

129 N. W.

Ann. Cas. I9 1 3 B, 675.

As in the preceding case, this action was brought to
determine entitlement to the office of county superintendent
of schools.
For rule, see final paragraph in preceding case.
Key UQ (it).

Removal or suspension.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key it8 (5).

Compensation.

Inasmuch as the cases in this Key section do not
strictly apply to a study of schools and school districts,
only the statutes and holdings are set forth.

For facts,

investigate citations.
(a)

Wi les V. McIntosh.

( 1901)

88 N. W.

710 ( 10 N. D. 59 I4.)

Under Rev. Codes, section 652, providing that, in
computing the salary of county superintendent, no school
shall be included unless it has been taught at least three
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months during the preceding year, and that the amount of his
salary shall be determined each year by the actual number of
schools or separate departments in graded schools, the sala
ries must be computed on the basis of the number of schools
or separate departments of graded schools presided over by
thesuperintendents,

which have been

months in the preceding year and are

taught atleast three
not to be computed on

the number of schools Wiich have been taught less than three
months•
( b)

Dickey County v. Denning.

( 1905)

103 N. W. U22 ( li+ N. D. 77)
Under Revised Codes 1Ô99» section 652, providing for
a graduated salary for county superintendents of schools
corresponding to the number of schools or departments of
graded schools under their official supervision in the pre
ceding year, schools in the special districts are not under
their official supervision, and are not to be included in
computing their salary.
(See also Dickev County v. Hicks.

( 1905)

103 N. W,

1*23 ( Ih N. D. 73)
(c)

State ex rel. Bickford v, Fabrick.

See Key i|.8 (3), Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, as follows:
A county superintendent of schools, lawfully holding
over after two years from his qualification as such, and
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( 1)

Where a proceeding has been instituted attempt

ing to challenge the validity of the formation of certain
reorganized districts purported to have been created under
the provisions of Chapter 15-53» NDRC I9 I4.3 and the 1914.9
Supplement thereto, and also attempting to challenge the
validity of the election of the school boards of such dis
tricts, and the Judge of the district court has issued a
memorandum opinion stating his determination to make an
order which will permit the boards of the new districts to
function in part and the boards of the old districts to also
function in part as governing bodies of districts embracing
the same or part of the same territory, thereby creating
confusion and duplication, public interest requires that
such a result be avoided, and, there being no speedy remedy
available, the exigency of the situation Justifies the
interposition of the general superintending power vested in
this court by the constitution.
(2)

Section 15-5322, 1914-9 Supplement NDRC 1914-3»

authorizes the election of school boards of newly elected
school districts at special elections, and a board so chosen
enters upon its duties on the first day of July succeeding
the final approval of the organized district.

Where final

approval of the district is had before July 1st and its
board is elected at a special election held after July 1st,
the board may organize and enter upon its duties forthwith.
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Key 5U*

Compensation,
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 55»

Powers and functions in general.
(a)

Pronovost v. Brunette.

(1917)

162 N. W. 300 (36 N. D. 288)
FACTS : A resolution was passed by the school board
providing for the calling of a special election "to vote on
the question whether or not the school in school district
No. i|.0, Cass County, shall be changed and removed from the
present schoolhouse to a room in St. Joseph’s Convent in the
same district."
HOLDING:

That both the order of the school board and

the election were void, and that the lease of the new build
ing and the removal of the one school to the other were un
warranted by the law and outside the power of the directors.
The legislative policy in North Dakota is that the public
schools in the common school districts of the state shall be
maintained in buildings which are owned by the public.
( b)

Rhea v. Board of Education of Devi Is

Lake School Dist.

( 1919)

171 N. W. 103 (i^-l N. D.

kk9)
QUESTION ;

The non-vaccination of children

is it

cause for excluding them from public schools in a state
#

where smallpox does not prevail, and where the sickness and
death resulting from vaccination far exceed that now
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resulting from smallpox?
RULE;

Boards of education and boards of health pos

sess only such powers as the statutes confer upon them.
Sections 1346 and 426, Comp. Laws 1913* are he Id not to
authorize the exclusion for non-vaccination...
(c )

Gi1lespie v. Common School District

No. 8 of McClean County.

{ 192?)

216 N. W. 564

( 56 N. D. 194)
FACTS;

This is an action in which the plaintiff, an

architect, conferred with two members of a school board with
respect to the matter of preparing plans and specifications
for a school building.

The meeting was informal and no min

utes were kept, though the clerk of the school board was
present.

A contract was signed, purporting to be made by

and between the plaintiff and "the board of Underwood school
district No. 6," after the meeting.

Subsequently the con

tract %fas also signed by a third director who had not been
at the meeting.

Some time later the school board notified

the architect (Gillespie) that they would no longer require
his services, and they entered into another contract with
another architect and built the schoolhouse.

Gillespie then

demanded payment of the remainder of the compensation which
he claimed under the contract, and when payment was refused
brought this action.
RULE;

A school district is not bound by the action
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of its directors unless such action is taken at a meeting
held and conducted as required by statute (Comp. Laws 1913,
section 1160).
Key 56.

School directors are agents of the district.
Modes of action in general.
No cases in North Dakota.
(a)

No. 22.

MeWithy v. Heart River School Dist.

( 191|-8)

For brief, see post Key ll|.l (5), Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section, as
follows :
School boards have only such powers as statutes con
fer on them.
Key 57.

Meetings.
(a)

State v. Tucker.

(1918)

166 N. W. 820

(39 N. D. 106)
In this action a mandamus is sought to compel a board
of arbitrators to reconvene and cause a due and proper levy
to be made upon the real and personal property of a school
district.

This action occurred because the plaintiffs

charged that the original meeting was improperly held inas
much as no written or printed notice of the meeting was
given to officials who were to appoint an arbitrator at a
special meeting.
RULE ; An appointment of an arbitrator which is made
at a special meeting of a school board which is not called
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in the manner prescribed by statute, and frcan which one of
the members is absent on account of not having received
notice thereof, is not binding upon the school district.
Section 12k7 of the Compiled Laws of 1913 provides
that :

"Special meetings may be called by the president or

in his absence by any two members of the board or by causing
a written or printed notice to be left at his.•.residence,
at least forty-eight hours before the time of such meeting."
( b)

Gi 1 lespie v. Common School Dist. N o . 8 ,

McClean County.

( 1927)

216 N. W. 56i^. (56 N. D. 194)

(See Key 55» Case ( c ))
Key 58-59.
Key 60.

No cases listed.

Operation and effect of decisions.
No cases listed in North Dakota.

Key 61.

Appeal from decisions.
No cases listed for North Dakota.

Key 62.

Liabilities of members.
( a)

Kenmare School District No.

County V. Cole et a l .

( 1917)

Ward

l6 l N. W. 5^2 ( 36

N. D. 32)
This is an action brought by the school district
against the members of the school board in which it is
sought to hold the latter personally liable for the payments
they made when they entered Into contracts on behalf of the
district involving obligations in excess of debt limit and
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in excess of the power to levy taxes, which contracts were
fully performed, resulting in the construction and equipment
of a high school building and in the issuance amd payment of
warrants for it.
RULE; Members of school board whose contracts for
construction and equipment of high school building Involved
obligations in excess of debt limit and power to levy taxes,
in violation of Comp. Laws 1913, Section 2218, were not, in
absence of fraud, personally liable for payments so made.
So it was held.
Key 6 3 .

District and other local officers.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 63 (1).

Appointment, qualification and tenure.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key 63 (2).

Title to and possession of office.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key 63 (3).

Powers, duties, and liabilities in

general.
(a)

Gi1lespie v. Common School Dist. No .

McClean County.

( 1927)

216 N. W.

(56 N. D, 194)

(See Key 55» Case (c))
School officers have and may exercise only powers ex
press ly or impliedly granted by statute (Comp. Laws 1913,
#

Section 1 1 6 0 ).
(b )

Schoo 1 Di st. No. 35 of. Cass County v.
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in excess of* the power to levy taxes, which contracts were
fully performed, resulting in the construction and equipment
of a high school building and in the Issuance and payment of
warrants for it.
RULE; Members of school board whose contracts for
construction and equipment of high school building involved
obligations in excess of debt limit and power to levy taxes,
in violation of Comp. Laws 1913, Section 2218, were not, in
absence of fraud, personally liable for payments so made.
So it was held.
Key 6 3 .

District and other local officers.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 63 (1).

Appointment, qualification and tenure.

No cases in North Dakota.
• Key 63 (2).

Title to and possession of office.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key 63 (3).

Powers, duties, and liabilities in

general.
(a)

Gi1lespie v. Common School Dist. N o . 8,

McClean County.

( 1927)

216 N. W. 5614. ( 56 N. D. 1914.)

(See Key 55» Case (c))
School officers have and may exercise only powers ex
press ly or impliedly granted by statute (Comp. Laws 19I3 ,
*

Section 1160).
(b)

School Dist. N o . 35 of Cass County v.

#
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Shinn.

( 1931)

237 N. W. 693 ( 6 l N. D. 160)

Plaintiffs brought action to recover alleged unlawful
payment of school district funds, approved and made by the
defendant as director and treasurer of the school district.
The alleged unlawful payments of school district
funds were approved and made by the Individual defendants
as directors and treasurer.
RULE;

Under Section 1168, Comp. Laws 1913» providing

that the school treasurer shall pay all warrants properly
dravm and signed when presented, if there Is any money In
his hands or subject to his order for payment, a treasurer
who pays for unauthorized or unlawful purposes Is not liable
on account of such payments, though he had knowledge of the
purposes for which the warrants were Issued, where they were
properly drawn and signed, and were not paid In bad faith or
with unlawful or fraudulent intent on his part.
Key 63 (2*.).
( a)

Liability on official bonds.
Prairie School T p . v. Hase leu

( 1893)

55 N. W. 938 ( 3 N. D. 326)
In this action bonds were issued and sold by the
school board, consisting of the treasurer, clerk and direc
tor, but the proceeds thereof were not paid to the treasurer.
RULE:

Laws I6 8 3 , c. W^» section 35* requires the

treasurer of a school township to give a bond for the dis
charge of the duties of the office, and for the rendition of
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a true account of money which shall come into his hands as
treasurer.
DECI5IGM: Where bonds were issued and sold by the
school board but the proceeds thereof were not paid to the
treasurer, the sureties on his bond, drawn substantially in
the terms of the statute are not liable for the loss of
funds•
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CHAPTER VI
DISTRICT PROPERTY, CONTRACTS, AND LIABILITIES
Key 61|..

Capacity to acquire and hold property.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 65.

Acquisition, use and disposition of

property in general.
No cases pertinent to this study.
Key 66.

School buildings.

Power to incur debts for school buildings.
(See post Key 90)
Key 6 7 .

Authority and duty to provide.
(a)

Directors.

State v. Mostad et al. School
(1916)

158 N. W. 349 (34 N. D. 330)

This is a special proceeding under Comp, Laws 1913,
Section 1 1 8 8 , by the State, on the relation of J . C. John
son, against Thorwald Mostad and others, as directors of
School District No. 10, in and for Ward County, to compel
the erection of a school to accommodate children now distant
more than two and one-half miles from any school in the dis
trict.
FACTS;

A qualified petition requesting that a school

be organized for nine or more children living not less than
two and one-half miles from the nearest school was presented
to the school board of District No, 10.

After submitting
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the <|uestion to a vote of the people, the majority of Artiom
voted against, the school board refused on their own author
ity, and on the authority granted by section 1185 of the
Conpiled Laws, to choose a site and erect a building.
RULE ;

In construing section 1188 of the Compiled

Laws of 1913, which provides that school boards of the vari
ous common school districts shall, upon the petition of
those charged with the support and having the care and cus
tody of nine or more children of school age, furnish accom
modations for such children within a distance of two and
one-half miles from their homes, such two and one-half miles
to be measured by the roads which are actually opened and
passable, and not as the crow flies, or by taking into con
sideration section lines which are set apart by section 1920
as highways, but which are not in their present condition
passable, and have not been actually opened for travel.
DECISION ; Affirmed for the plaintiff.
(b)

Kretchmer et al v. School Board of

Di strict N o . 12. Barnes County, et al.

( 1916)

158 N. W. 993 (34 N. D, 4 0 3 )
FACTS; The plaintiffs seek to enjoin the school
board from maintaining an alleged high school in the dis
trict before first submitting the question of such addi-

#

tional high school to the voters of the district.
RULE; Under Compiled Laws 1913» sections 1174, 118 4 ,

«
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a district school board has no authority to establish an
additional school in a new location even if not intended as
high school without submission of question to popular vote.
DECISION;

Held for plaintiffs.

(c)

Wulfkhul V. Galehouse.

( 1918)

168

N. W. 620 (if.0 N. D. 172)
Facts similar to those in Case (a) this K e y .

Ruled

as in Case ( a ) .
( d)

Henderson et al v. Long Creek School

Di st. N o . 2 oT Divide County et a l .

(1919)

171

N. W. 825 (If.1 N. D. 6 I4.O)
In this action» to recover for labor and materials
furnished» the complaint alleged that the plaintiffs erected
a schoolhouse which was needed for the accommodation of the
school children of the defendant district» and that such
action was taken by plaintiffs following an adverse vote at
two separate elections on the proposition of bonding the
district for the purpose of erecting a schoolhouse to take
the place of a building which had been condemned by the
board of health.
FACTS; As alleged in the foregoing paragraph.
RULE:

Section II8I4. of the Compiled Laws of 1913

authorizes boards of directors of common school districts
to erect schooIhouses only when directed to do so by a
majority of voters of the district.
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DECISICM :

Complaint does not state a cause of action.

He Id for defendants.
Key 68,

Location.
(a)

Farmers * and Merchants * National Bank

of Valley City v. School Pi strict N o . $3.

( l869)

42 N. W. 76? (6 Dak. 2^5)
FACTS: The action was brought to enforce payment of
certain school warrants alleged to have been issued by the
defendant through its school board.

Findings of fact were

made that the inhabitants of the district did not direct the
making of or make the contract under iidiich the schoolhouse
was erected, did not consent to it, did not select it or
authorize the selection of the site upon which it was to be
erected, and had never in any way ratified the acts of the
school board in issuing warrants for the construction of a
schoolhouse.
RULE:

Laws 1879, c. 14, section 29, subd. 4t pro

vides that inhabitants qualified to vote at a district meet
ing may vote for a site for a schoolhouse.

By subdivision 5

they may vote a tax to purchase or lease such a site.

By

section $6 it is made the duty of the district "to purchase
or lease such site for a schoolhouse as shall have been
designated by the voters at a district meeting," and to
build such a schoolhouse as the voters of the district shall
have agreed upon.
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DECISION:

The power to acquire a site for a school

house is vested exclusively in the voters of the district,
and the board have no independent authority whatever.
Judgment for the defendants affirmed.
( b)

Petersburg School District of Nelson

County V. Peterson.

( 1905)

105 N. W. 756 ( 11*. N. D.

344)
FACTS :

The defendant appealed from a Judgment that

certain described lands belonging to him be condemned as a
schoolhouse site upon payment of damages to him.

The school

board had called a meeting of the voters of the district to
vote upon the selection and purchase of a site as provided
in section 701, Rev. Codes 1899.

At this meeting a majority

of votes %/as cast in favor of a site described as follows:
"For locating a new schoolhouse on the hill at the south end
of Sixth Street, in Peterson *s field."

The school board met

later and fixed the description of the land precisely.
The appellant, however, contended that the voters of
the school district had not selected a definite site.

That

the wording ( as set forth in the above paragraph) was too
indefinite, and therefore insufficient on which to base con
demnation proceedings.
RULE:

Under Section 701, Rev. Codes 1899, voters of

a school district are required only to select a school site
by a general designation, and not by definite description.
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DECISION ; Affirmed for plaintiffs.
(c)Iverson v. Williams School District.
(1919)

172 N. w. 818 (I4.2 N, D. 6 2 2 )

This action Is an appeal from an order denying the
plaintiff’s motion for an injunction to restrain performance
of certain contracts entered into between the defendant
school district and certain contractors, looking toward the
construction of a new school building.
FACTS : The school board of the district held a
special meeting at which it was decided to call a special
election to vote upon the question of consolidating all the
schools of the district, to select a building site for a
central school, and to provide a suitable building.

The

election was duly held, and the majority vote was in the
affirmative.

However, the plaintiffs later brought action

on the grounds that the ballot did not give sufficient in
formation regarding the selection of building site and the
amount of the proposed new building.
true.

Their contention was

The board had held a later election, however, at

which they had given specific information on the ballot.
The plaintiffs contended that the first election invalidated
the succeeding election because the people had actually not,
even originally, voted for a building nor a site.

The

board, however, had taken action on the proposals; and the
plaintiffs moved for an injunction to restrain performance
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of certain contracts entered into by the school district.
In the subsequent election, also, the voters had
voted affirmatively in the majority.
RULE:

Com. Laws 1913, sections 1185, 1185, and 1190,

and Laws 1915, c. 127, authorize the question of building
new buildings to be determined exclusively by the voters in
the common school districts...also the questions of consoli
dation of schools, and the selection of sites is to be de
termined exclusively by the voters.
DECIS1Œ:

Where an election results in a failure to

select a site for a schoolhouse by reason of indefiniteness
of the question submitted, and the question is again sub
mitted, resulting in the selection of the site previously
assumed to have been legally selected, the previous invalid
selection is ratified.

An injunction here would perform no

useful purpose.
Affirmed for defendants.
Key 69.

Change of site.
(a)

Torgerson et a l . v . Golden Va 1lev

School Pi st. N o . 85 of Wi 1liams County et a l .

( 1919)

171 N. W. 626 (i|2 N. D. 5)
This action is one involving the validity of an elec
tion held in the defendant school district fbr the purpose of
changing the location of the consolidated school therein.
FACTS :

Under the authority of section 1190, Compiled
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Laws of 1913, an election was held on August 1, 1917, re
sulting in the consolidation of the schools participating,
and the site of the consolidated school was determined to be ,
a site already owned by the district near the village of
Temple.

In the month of May following, a petition was pre

sented to the school board, signed by more than one-third of
the electors of the district, asking that an election be
called to submit the question asking for the removal or
change of site of the consolidated school from the village
of Temple to a site in section 16 in the same township.

In

pursuance of the petition, an election was held, at which a
majority voted in favor of the site in section l6.

Majority

less than required.
QUESTION ;

Is the last election legal?

RULE; Where a consolidated school is formed and a
site selected by the electors of the district, acting under
section 1190, Compiled Laws of 1913, such school csmnot be
removed without a two-thirds vote of the electors, proceed
ing under sections 118b. and 1185 of the Compiled Laws of
1913.
DECISION ; Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
(b)

Dei de et a^ v. Antelope School Di strict

No. 7 of Stark County et al.

( 1920)

173 N. W. QI[P
»

(b4 N. D. 256)
This is an action to restrain and enjoin the

«
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defendant from moving what is known as schoolhouse No. 1,
located within the school district in question, from its
present location to Antelope, which is about one-half mile
distant from the present location.
FACTS ;

The school board called an election for the

specific purpose of voting upon the removal of a schoolhouse
from present site to another definite location, which was
named in the resolution.

The notice of the election did not

state the purpose of the election in accordance with the
resolution of the school board and the provision in section
118$, Compiled Laws 1913.
RULE:

Section 1185 of the Ccmpiled Laws of 1913 con

tains the following with reference to the notices of elec
tion:

"Three notices of the time, place and purpose of such

election shall be posted in three of the most public places
in the district at least fourteen days prior to such meet
ing."
DECISION:

The notice of election was insufficient...

that the election held in pursuance of such invalid notice
was invalid.
Judgment for the appellants (plaintiffs).
(c)

Barnes et al v, Meehan et a l .

( 1927)

212 N. W. 856 (55 N. D. 22k)
This action arose out of the contesting of an elec
tion which was held for the purpose of voting on the
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question of moving a schoolhouse from one location to
another within the district.
FACTS :

For our purposes, it is necessary to merely

state that the school election was contested because there
was evidence that it was not satisfactorily conducted or
supervised.
A restraining order was issued by the Judge of the
district restraining the defendants from moving the school
house from its present location during the pendency of the
contest and until the further order of the court.
The contest proceeding was begun under section IOI4.6
of the Compiled Laws of 19 I3 .
RULE ;

Section IOI4.6 of the Compiled Laws of 1913 pro

vides for instituting election contests by notice.

The sec

tion, however, is designed to give the right of contest to
persons "claiming the right to hold an office, or an elector
of the proper county desiring to contest the validity of an
election..."

Nowhere in the article is there any provision

referring to contests of school elections upon the proposi
tion for the removal of schoolhouses.
DECISION : Contest by notice is a statutory proceed
ing, and may only be resorted to in those instances where it
has been authorized.
Judgment for defendants affirmed.
70.

Purchase or hiring.
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(a)

Pronovost v. Brunette.

(1917)

162

N. W. 300 (36 N. D. 288)
(See brief of this case in Key 55.)
Supplementary holding to above case:
Under Compiled Laws 1913» sections 1171k, 1l8ik, where
a common school district owns school building adequate to
its needs, and there are not nine school children residing
two and one-half miles therefr<m for whom additional accom
modations are needed, district has no authority to lease
another building and remove school thereto.
Key 71.

Construction.
(a)

Iverson v. Wi lliams School District.

(For case brief, see Key 68.)
Selection of school sites held determinable exclu
sively by voters within the common school district.
Key 72.

Control and use.
No cases for North Dakota.

Key 73.

Care, maintenance, and repair.

Liability for tort, see post. Key 89.
Key 7 I4..

^a le or other disposition.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 7 5 .

School furniture, books, apparatus, and

other appliances.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 7 6 .

School libraries.
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No cases In North Dakota.
Key 77.

Contracts.
No cases for North Dakota.

Key 7 8 .

Capacity of district to contract in general.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 79*

Powers of district or other board officers.
(a)

Capital Bank of St. Paul v. School

Di st. N o . g3 of Barnes County.

( I8 9 0 )

i^8 N. W, 363

( 1 N. D. 14.7 9 )
FACTS ; The minutes of a district school meeting dis
closed that a motion was carried to build a schoolhouse, a
tax levied for that purpose, and the school board was ap
pointed as a building committee, but it did not appear that
the meeting selected a site or directed the erection of any
buiIding.
RULE :

Laws 1879, c. II4., section $6, provide that the

board shall purchase or lease such site as shall have been
designated by the school meeting, and shall build such
schoolhouse as the voters in the district meeting shall have
agreed upon.
DECISION ; The proceedings at the school meeting did
not authorize the board to build a schoolhouse.
(b)

Ellingson v. Cherry Lake School Dis-

trict.

( 192 7 )

212 N. W. 773 (55 N. D. 14 1 )

FACTS ;

In May, 1926, the board of directors of the
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defendant school district published a notice for bids for
certain improvements of schoolhouse No, I4. in the district.
The then condition of the schoolhouse and the proposed im
provements are described as follows in the affidavit :
"That the schoolhouse to be remodelled was con
structed in 1 9 lit-, and when built itwas approved,..The inside
ceiling (now) is not in good repair, and the building is
rather cold*
"The outside toilets are also in bad repair and will
have to be rebuilt...
"...and contract let for the remodeling of said
building provides for a basement under the schoolhouse, a
furnace, inside toi lets,..a cistern in the basement, with a
f1 Iter..."
A statement of contemplated improvements continues.
QUESTION :

Is the plaintiff correct in his contention

that the contract in this case provides for remodeling and
alteration, and that the school board have no authority to
enter into such a contract unless they are authorized to do
so by a vote of the electors of the district?
RULE; The board of a common school district may con
tract to remodel the schoolhouse to provide for heating,
water supply, and toilet facilities without submitting the
proposition to a vote.
1175,

llS lj.,

(Compiled Laws 1913, sections 1173,

1186)
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Key 80.

Making, requisites,, and validity.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 80 (1).

In general.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key 80 (2).
(a )
No.

Proposals or bids.
Rosatti v. Common Schoo1 Pis trict

Cass County.

( 1925)

20li. N. W. 833 (52 N. D.

931)
FACTS ;

That the plaintiff, an architect, entered

into an express contract with the defendant whereby the
former performed professional services as an architect in
the preparation of plans, general drawings, and specifica
tions, and made preliminary studies for the construction of
a school for the defendant ; that the agreed value for such
services was the sum of $1,557.50; that the defendant, a
common school corporation, refused to pay on the grounds
that, in the exercise of the powers granted to school
boards, such boards are limited by the provisions of sec
tion 1259, C. L, 1913* which reads in part :
"No expenditure involving an amount greater than one
hundred dollars shall be made except in accordance with the
provisions of a written contract, and no contract involving
an expenditure of more than five hundred dollars for the
purpose of erecting any public buildings or making any im
provements shall be made except upon sealed proposals and to
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the lowest responsible bidder, after public notice for four
teen days previous to receiving such bids."
RULE:

By the amendment of section 1356, chapter 266,

S. L. 1911, contracts for professional services were excepted
from the requirement that contracts for the expenditure of
school funds be let only after advertising for proposals and
to the lowest responsible bidder.
DECISION: Affirmed for the plaintiff.
(b)

Ellinoson v. Cherry Lake School

District.
For brief, see ante Key 79, Case (b).
Further ruling in the case,

pertinent to this Key

section, as follows:
"Responsible," as in "lowest responsible bidder," in
cludes integrity, skill, ability, and capacity to perform
particular work

( C otip.

(c)
Dist. No. 21.

Laws 1913* section 1356).

SJt. Paul Foundry Co. v. Burnstad School
( 1936)

269 N. W. 738 (67 N. D. 61)

FACTS : The defendants, a public school corporation,
set out to build a gymnasium after rejecting as too high the
bids that had been submitted.

Before finally proceeding to

build they published no further advertisement for bids,
either for general construction or for material or labor.
It procured structural steel from the plaintiff.
the

So far as

records of the school district show, no contract with
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the plaintiff was authorized or entered into by the defend
ant district or the school board thereof.
the steel.

But it procured

Thereafter, on January 2 3 , 1930, the warrant in

suit was issued in the amount of $732,03 in payment of the
bill to plaintiff.

The warrant was registered and noted as

not paid for want of funds.

Plaintiff sued to recover

amount of the warrant.
Defendant defends on ground that the warrant is void
because it was Issued in payment of the purchase price of
certain material used in the construction of a school build
ing, which said material was purchased Illegally and without
first advertising for bids as required by statute.
DECISION :

Statute requiring competitive bidding in

letting contracts Involving expenditure of school funds he Id
not repealed by implication by subsequent statute requiring
ccanpetitive bidding in letting contracts for repair work in
excess of $3,000, which provided for repeal of all conflict
ing acts, since there was no irreconcilable inconsistency
(Comp. Laws 1913, section 1356; Laws 1929, c . 195).
The question here is not as to whether the plaintiff
can recover the property obtained from it by the defendant
or the reasonable value thereof.

The plaintiff seeks to

recover the contractual purchase price.
Affirmed for defendant.

Contract for purchase of

steel used in building school gymnasium entered into without
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observing mandatory provisions of statute requiring competi
tive bidding for letting such contracts held invalid.
Key 01,

Contractors' bonds.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 8l (1).

Bonds of textbook publishers.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key 81 (2).

Bonds of contractors for construction of

schoolhouses.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 82.

Unauthorized or illegal contracts.
(a)

Capital Bank of St. Paul v. School

Dist. No. 55 of Barnes County.
For brief, see ante Key 79, Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
"Laws Dak. 18?9, c. 1^., section 29» gives the school
district meeting power 'to vote a tax annually, not exceed
ing one per cent of the taxable property...to purchase or
lease a site, and to build, hire, or purchase a school
house.'

Section 56 provides that the school board shall

build, purchase, or lease a school house 'out of the funds
provided for that purpose.'

He Id that the school meeting

could not authorize a contract for a schoolhouse for an
amount exceeding the funds on hand and the annual tax of
one per cent actually levied, and the use of the house by
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the district created no liability either under the contract
or for the value received,"
Further :

A contract, authorized by the inhabitants

of a school district at a district meeting, to build a
schoolhouse for an amount in excess of funds on hand or
subject to collection for that purpose and the amount that
could be realized from the maximum tax which could be levied
by the inhabitants for the current year and used for that
purpose, is void.
Key 82 (2).
(a)

Ratification of contracts.
Capita 1 Bank of St. Fau1 v. Schoo1

Di st. N o . ^3 of Barnes County.
See preceding case.
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
"A contract to build schoolhouse for an amount in ex
cess of funds available, void because the district board had
no authority to make it, could not be made binding upon the
district by subsequent ratification by the inhabitants."
(b )
No.

G i 1lesple v , Common Schoo 1 District

6, McClean Cou n t y .

For brief, see ante Key 55» Case (c).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
"Contract of school directors with architect to draw
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plans of building, invalid for irregularities, held binding
on the district through subsequent ratification,"
Further ;

"Contract by school directors, not binding

on district for irregularities, may became binding by sub
sequent ratification if contract was within power of dis
trict and might lawfully be made when executed."

(Also

ruled in case following.)
(c)

Paul Foundry Co, v. Burnstad School

District No. j_l.
For brief, see ante Key 80 (2), Case (c).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
Refer to final paragraph ruling above from Gillespi e
V,

Common School District N o . 8, McClean County.
Further :

"When school district warrant was unen

forceable because of failure to observe requirement of com
petitive bidding, school district officers* subsequent
recognition of validity of warrant held not such ratifica
tion as would make enforceable where there was at no time
any attempt to comply with statutory requirements for com
petitive bidding,"
Key 8 3 ,

Implied contracts.
(a)

Henderson v. Long Creek School Di st.
m

N o . 2 of Divide County.
For brief, see ante Key 67* Case (d).

#
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Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
"In view of Comp. Laws 1913# section 118^_, where
board of a common school district, who had not obtained
requisite authority, refused to contract for construction
of schoolhouse, the district was not liable upon contract
by its acceptance of a building so constructed without
authority,"
Key 81^.

Construction and operation.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key

Modification and reel si on: .
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 85.

Performance or breach,
(a)

Kasbo Const. C o . v, Minto School Di st,

of Cavalier County,

( 1921)

iQl^ N. W, 1029 (i;8

N. D. i|^3)
FACTS :

Plaintiff’s action is to recover the balance

claimed to be due under the terms of a written contract, and
for extras alleged to have been furnished for the construetion of a schoolhouse.

The defendant interposed a defense

to the effect that the building was not constructed in ac
cordance with the terms of the contract, plans, nor specifi
cations; that the workmanship was poor, etc.

The evidence

abundantly established that the building was not constructed
according to specifications, and that it was very defective.
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After completion of the schoolhouse, the defendant school
district used the building, and the plaintiff thereupon con
tended that the district had accepted possession of the
buiIding,
RULE;

(1)

Where a building contract was defectively

performed. If the defects were irremediable, the contractor
was not entitled to recover, but, if remediable, he was en
titled to recover the contract price plus proved extras
which ought to be paid for, less the amount necessary to
remedy defects.
(2)

In an action against a district for balance of

constructing a schoolhouse, where there was no other place
where a school could be held, so that the defendant was com
pelled to use the defective building, by doing so it waived
none of its claims or causes of action for defective con
struction.
Judgment affirmed for defendant.
Key 86,

Remedies of parties.

Key 86 (1).

Contracts for textbooks.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key 86 (2).

Contracts for construction or equipment

of schoolhouses.
(a)

Henderson v. Long Creek School Di st.

N o . 2, Divide County.
For brief and decision, see ante Key 6?, Case (d).
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( b)
No.

BarteIson v. Internat iona1 SchooI Di s t .

Portai Township.

(1919)

171& N. W. 78 ( W

N. D. 2 5 3 )
(Because of the unusual nature of this case--its cir
cumstances and the decision deriving from it--it shall be
set forth at some length from the opinion of one of the
Supreme Court Judges who reviewed it, and who entered judg
ment reversing the trial court Judgment, which held for the
plaintiff.)
This is an action where it is sought to recover the
amount due a contractor for the construction of a school
building, in excess of the constitutional debt limit, by re
quiring the school district to return the property received
or be declared a trustee for the use or rental value there
of, and where it appears that the building cannot be re
turned, or any part thereof segregated, without destruction
or loss of property of the municipality, and that no burden
can be imposed upon the municipality without exceeding the
debt limit.
FACTS ;

In May, 1913, pursuant to an election, so

authorizing, the board of education made a contract with the
plaintiff to erect a high school building for the contract
price of $214.,0 0 0 .

Accordingly the building was constructed,

and its value, as stipulated, since ccmpletion is $ 3 0 ,0 0 0 .
The plaintiff has received $19,769.10.

There is a balance
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due and unpaid of $14.,290.90, with interest.
In 1914 an action to enjoin the school district, its
officers, and the plaintiff herein was instituted by a resi
dent taxpayer of the district to enjoin further issuance or
reception of warrants in payment of outstanding warrants for
the construction of such building.
V.

In that case (Anderson

International School Di strict — see post Key 90, Case ( b))

this court, in November held that the contract created a
present debt against the district, greatly in excess of the
constitutional debt limit, and that to the extent of such
excess the contracts were void, and enjoined further pay
ments thereon.
The sole question involved...is the right of the
plaintiff in equity, upon the facts, to obtain relief for
the amount unpaid and due him.
Equity properly recognizes that a municipal corpora
tion should not be permitted to take the property of
another, and receive the benefits thereof, and thus be en
riched through the loss of another, without compensation.
On the other hand, constitutional limitations upon
the creation of indebtedness of municipalities are mandatory
restrictions, enacted for the purpose of curbing taxing
power and of restraining excessive expenditures, that entail
tax burdens.

It is well settled that those who deal with

municipalities are bound to take notice and be bound by

«
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these constitutional restrictions.
RULE;

Accordingly, it must be recognized that, in

applying equitable relief in the present form of action,
equity must not accomplish by indirection what the law has
prescribed must not be done directly.
DECISION ;

Judgment reversed in favor of defendant.

(c)

Kasbo Const. Co. v, Minto School D

trict of Caval1er County.
For brief, see ante Key 85, Case (a).
Key 87 - 8 8 .

District expenses and charges, and

liabilities specially imposed by statute.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 8 9 .

Torts.
(a )

of Fargo.
FACTS ;

Anderson v . Board of Education of City

( 1922)

190 N. W. 807 (i^-9 N. D. I8 I)

Plaintiff brought an action against the de

fendant, charging it in her complaint with negligence in
establishing and maintaining upon its school playgrounds
certain apparatus, consisting of several heavy swings and
chutes, more particularly described in the complaint, and in
appropriate language alleging that her son, while on the
school playgrounds, by reason of such negligence was injured
and killed.

She claimed damages in the sum of $25,000, and

in addition thereto $200 to cover burial expenses of the boy
and for physician’s fees.
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RUIÆ:

The board of education of the city of Fargo,

a body corporate by virtue of a special law approved March 14.,
1 8 8 5 , as amended, authorizing such board to provide such ap

paratus as is necessary for the physical improvement and
health of the pupils, in providing heavy swings and chutes
on a school playground acted in a purely governmental capa
city, and was not subject to a suit, either In action for
damages or otherwise for the death of a pupil injured and
killed when struck by an iron-barred swing seat in operation
on the school playgrounds,
DECISION : Judgment affirmed for defendant.

«
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CHAPTER VII
DISTRICT DEBTS, SECURITIES, AND TAXATION
Key 90.

Power to incur Indebtedness and expenditures.
(a)

Farmers * and Merchants * National Bank

of Vallev City v. School Di strict N o . ^3.
For brief, see ante Key 68, Case (a ).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
"Laws 1 8 7 9 , c. 14> restricts the amount of obliga
tions a school district may incur in any one year to 1^ per
cent on the value of the taxable property in the district.
Held that warrants payable immediately, for sums exceeding
such percentage, are invalid."
(b)

Anderson v. Internat!onal School Dis-

trict N o . St Portal Township.

( 1916)

1^6 N. W. Sk-

( 3 2 N. D. 14.1 3 )

FACTS :

Defendant school district, whose debt limit

was about $16,000, entered into a contract on May 27, 1913,
with defendant BarteIson for the erection of a schoolhouse
at the agreed price of $2lj.,000.

Eighty-five per cent of

the labor and materials furnished was payable monthly upon
estimates of the architect, and the balance within a short
time after the completion of the building, which was to be
ccmipleted on or before October 15, 1913, entered into two
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other contrectSÿ one for heeting and ventilating the build
ing, and the other for lighting it, which called for addi
tional payments on the completion thereof.
RULE;

(1)

In Const. section 183 , limiting to five

per cent the debt of school districts, the word "debt" in
cludes liabilities created under executory contracts for
public improvements, though nothing is due thereon until
same are executed in part or in whole.
(2 )

In determining whether the five per cent limit

on indebtedness, prescribed by Const, section I8 3 , has been
exceeded, funds in the school district’s treasury available
for meeting its liabilities and also taxes levied and uncol
lected may be considered, but the district officers cannot
anticipate revenues from future levies.
DECISIGN ;

He Id that these contracts created a

present debt against the district at the date they were
entered into, which debt, after deducting available funds in
the treasury applicable to the payment thereof, greatly ex
ceeded the constitutional debt limit, and to the extent of
such excess the contracts are void, and further payments
thereon are enjoined.
(c)

Rosatti V, Common School District N o .

9 6 , Cass County.

For brief, see ante Key 80 (2), Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this
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section» as follows:
(1)

Comp. Laws 1913» section 1259, relating to ex

penditure of school money, being part of article 9 , c. 1 2 ,
dealing with special school districts, is limitation on
powers of boards of education of special school districts
only, and does not apply to common school district boards,
sections 1 1 7 3 -1 2 0 7 dealing with powers and duties of common
school boards.
(2)

Comp. Laws 1913, section 1356, included in c. 12,

and restricting expenditure of school money is a statute of
general application, and, unless otherwise provided, oper
ates to circumscribe powers of all school boards, including
those of common school districts, regardless of sections
1 1 8 4 , 1 1 8 5 , relating to powers of such districts.

(d)
District N o .
FACTS :

J ones v . Bri ghtwood Independent Sc
( 1933)

2^7 N. W. 884 (63 N. D. 275)

Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants

from levying taxes to pay certain warrants and bonds Issued
by Bri ghtwood independent school district No. 1, Rich land
County,

Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants arc

paying Illegal debts, are threatening to continue illegal
and excessive tax levies, and will do so unless enjoined.
RULE:

Resident taxpayers seeking to enjoin school

district from levying taxes to pay outstanding indebtedness,
some of which was clearly legal, must differentiate between
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lega 1 and illegal indebtedness, and establish amount there
of.
DECISION : Judgment affirmed for defendants.
( e)

Knudson v. Norm am School

No. — , Traill County.

( 1934) 256 N.

District
W. 224 (64

N. D. 779)
Not pertinent to this study.
(f)
( 1941)

State V. Rasmusson. County Auditor.

300 N. W. 25 (71 N. 0. 267)

See post Key 100, Case (a).
Key 91,

Constitutional and statutory provisions.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 92.

Administration of finances in general.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 92 (1). Custody and disbursement of funds.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 92 (2)-94.
Key 95.

No titles listed.

Warrants, orders, and certificates of in

debtedness.
Action against officers issuing order, see ante Key
62.
Key 95(1).

In general.

(a)

Farmers' and Merchants * National Bank

of Valley City v. School District N o . 53.
For brief see ante Key 6 8 , Case (a).

Also for

#
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additional ruling see same case in Key 90, Case (a).
Ruling pertinent to this Key section, as follows:
"Where the statute, section 29, subd. l|., c. li^. Laws
1 8 7 9 , required that the voters of a school district should

select a site for a schoolhouse, and the district board,
without this having first been done, selected it, built a
house and issued warrants therefor without the authority
and ratification of the voters, he Id the warrants were void
...where there was a restriction on the amount of revenue a
school district might raise in any one year, and a board in
issuing certain warrants payable immediately, exceeded this
limit, held, the warrants were void."
Key 95 (2).

Issuance, requisites and validity.

(a)
School Township.
FACTS :

Goose River Bank v. Wi 11 iston Lake
( 1890)

W 4. N. W. 1002 (1 N. D. 26)

The action was upon three school township

warrants issued by the officers of the defendant.

They were

issued to pay for the services of a teacher who held no law
ful certificate of qualification.
RULE:

Every contract relating to the employment of a

teacher who does not hold a lawful certificate of qualifica
tion is void by the express terms of the statute ( section
1 7 2 3 , Comp, Laws), and every warrant Issued in payment of

services of such teacher Is without consideration and void,
DECI SION :

The teacher had no claim against the
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dëfend&nt, b 6 C3>use the statute declares she should not have
been employed to teach, and every act in violation of this
provision was a nullity, so far as the liability of the de
fendant is concerned.

The plaintiff cannot claim protection

as innocent purchaser for value.

That such instruments are

not negotiable in the sense that their negotiation will cut
off defenses is the voice of all decisions.
Judgment affirmed in favor of defendant.
(b)

Crane and Ordwav Co. v. Svkeston Schoo

District No. 11.

(1917)

162 N. W. i^.13 ( 3 6 N. D. 2^)

FACTS ; This action arises out of a contractor's in
ducing a board of directors of a school district to issue a
district warrant by making false representations as to the
payment for materials used in the performance of a contract
between such contractor and the district.

The contractor's

representation that all materials and labor had been paid
for was false.
RULE: Where contractor induces directors of a school
district to issue a warrant by false representations as to
payment for material used under a contract with district,
warrant may be rescinded, and contractor be required to sur
render it for cancellation.
(c )

Osage Farmers National Bank v. Van Hook

Special School District No. 8 .

{ 1935)

263 N. W. l62

( 66 N. D. 1 9 6 )
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FACTS :

Plaintiff brought this action to recover on

certain warrants alleged to have been issued by the defend
ant school district.

All the warrants involved in. this case

were presented to the treasurer of the defendant school dis
trict for payment either on the day on which they were
issued or within three days afterward.

The warrants were

endorsed by the school treasurer as provided by law to the
effect that they had been presented for payment and not paid
for vrant of funds.

Six years later the plaintiff commenced

this action, and the defendant contended that the rights and
causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations,
RULE ;

In these circumstances the statute of limita

tions did not commence to run until the warrants were called
for payment and notice given to the holder as required by
law,
DECISION:

Judgment affirmed for plaintiff,
( d)

Paul Foundry C o , v. Burnstad School

Dist, N o . 3 1 .
For brief, see ante Key 80 (2), Case (c).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
"Warrant issued by school district in payment of
obligation arising out of contract which was invalid for
failure to observe statutory provision requiring ccanpetitive
bidding held unenforceable, since the warrant created no
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greater liability than the debt it represented."
Key 95 (3). Negotiability and transfer.
Goose River Bank v. Wi 1 low Lake School

(a)
To%mshlp.

For brief, see ante Key 95 (2 ), Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
(1)

Warrants for the payment of a t eacher *s services

are not negotiable so as to cut off defenses, and an assigiee
cannot recover thereon as being a bona fide purchaser.
(2)

School township warrants are not negotiable in

struments, in the sense that their negotiation will cut off
defenses existing against them in the hands of the payee.
(b)

Capital Bank of St. Paul v. School

District No.
For brief, see ante Key 79, Case Ca).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
A warrant issued by a school district, though in the
hands of a bona fide purchaser, creates no greater liability
than the demand represents, and it is subject to the same
defenses.
Key 95 (if.).

Payment.

(a )
V.

School District N o . 35 of Cass County

Shinn.

*
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For brief, see ante Key 63 (3), Case ( b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
School treasurer is ministerial officer without dis
cretion respecting payment of warrants properly drawn and
signed (Comp. Laws 1913, sections II6 I, 1 1 6 8 , 1173).
Key 95 (5)*

Rights and remedies of holders.

(a)

Capital Bank of S t . Pau 1 v. School

District N o . 63 of Barnes County.
For brief, see ante Key 79, Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
A warrant creates no greater liability than the debt
it represents, whether in the hands of the original party or
of a purchaser before maturity and for value.
( b)

Crane and Ordway C o . v, Sykeston School

Dist. N o . 11.
For brief, see ante Key 9 6 (2), Case (b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
That members of a school board have disbursed funds
in payment of individual Judgments against them for material
supplied to the district does not prevent them from defend
ing an action on a school district warrant which had been
obtained by fraud.
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(c )

Osage Farmers National Bank v. Van Hook

Special School District N o . 8 .
For brief, see ante Key 95 (2 ), Case (c).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
Where payment of school district warrant was refused
on presentment for want of funds, indorsement to such effect
was made on warrant by school district treasurer and warrant
was registered in treasurer's books, limitation did not com
mence to run until warrant was called for payment and notice
given to holder to present warrant for payment.
Key 9 6 .

Bills and notes.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 97.

Bonds,
See Key 97 (1)

Key 97 (1).
(a)

immediately following.

Authority to issue bonds in general.
Prairie School

v. Hase leu.

For brief, see ante Key 6 3 , Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
Laws 1 8 8 3 , c. ^-5, section 1 , provides that school
township bonds shall be signed by the township clerk and
director.

Section 2 provides that all moneys received from

the sale of the bonds shall be paid to the treasurer.
that

He Id

thetreasurer has no authority as such to issue or
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sell bonds.
(b)

Schouweller v. A1 len.

( 1908)

11 ?

N. W. 866 ( 17 N. D. 510)
FACTS : After a majority of the voters of a school
district had instructed the school board to issue bonds for
building purposes, a taxpayer and voter of the district
brouÿit suit to enjoin the issuance of the bonds voted,
alleging that enough illegal votes were cast in favor of
the bonds to change the result.
The school board answered, denying all allegations of
the complaint relating to illegal votes ; but subsequently a
majority of the board stipulated personally with the plain
tiff in such action that Judgment should be rendered and
entered in favor of the plaintiff permanently enjoining the
defendants from issuing the bonds so voted.
Held that such stipulation constitutes collusion be
tween the plaintiff and the officers, and a legal fraud upon
the district and the court.
RULE ;

The officers of a school district are in

effect agents of the voters and taxpayers, and when the dis
trict, at a regularly called and conducted election, votes
to issue the bonds of the district and from the proceeds to
build a schoolhouse, such vote is an instruction by the
principal, and such officers have no discretion as to obey
ing instructions.
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Ke^ 97 (2 ).

Funding indebtedness.

( a)
County.

State v. School Dist. N o . 90 of Barnes

( 1909)

120 N. W. 555 ( 18 N. D. 6 l6 )

FACTS AND RULE : The municipal bonds of defendant
school district which are sued upon in this case were issued
without first submitting to the electors of the school dis
trict the question of their issuance* and, furthermore, the
school district had no power to issue the same by the ex
press provisions of the act under which it is claimed they
were issued as there were not 25 legal votes cast in such
district at the preceding annual school election therein.
Chapter 1 1 , p. 39, Laws 1887, under which the plaintiff con
tends such bonds were issued, is printed upon the back of
the bonds, and section 9 thereof expressly provides that the
question of refunding prior indebtedness shall be first sub
mitted to a vote of the qualified voters of the district
after giving certain notice therein prescribed of an elec
tion for such purpose, and that the proposition to issue
such bonds must receive the affirmative votes of at least
two-thirds of all the votes cast ; also that no school dis
trict in which less than 25 legal votes were cast at the
annual school election next preceding the issuance of such
bonds shall avail itself of the provisions of this act.
DECISICN ;

Judgment affirmed for defendant.

that such bonds are void.

*
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Key 97 (3)-

Limitation of amount of bonds.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key 97 (U).

Submission of question of issue to

popular vote .
(a)

Shouwei1er v, A1 len.

For brief, see ante Key 97 (1), Case (b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
Rev. Codes 190$, section 911, providing that if a
majority of all the votes cast at a school district election
shall be in favor of issuing bonds, the school board, through
its proper officers, shall forthwith issue the bonds, is
mandatory.
(b)

Shir1ey v. Coal Field School Dist. N o .

16, Divide County.

( 1920)

179 N. W. 5$1 (I4.6 N. D.

51)
FACTS ;

This is an action to enjoin school officials

from issuing school bonds approved by the voters at a spe
cial election, where the complaint alleges active fraud and
fraudulent design on the part of the school officials in the
calling of such election, the posting of notices thereof,
and in the t ime when the same was held for the purpose of
preventing an expression by the majority of the voters in
the di strlet...the clerk of the district did, however, post
notices of such election, viz., one at the post office, one
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at. the village hall, one at the town pump house, and one at
the schoolhouse, all In the village of Noonan.
RULE:

In a special election to vote upon an issue of

school bonds pursuant to section 1333, Comp. Laws 1913,
notices thereof posted in at least three public and conspic
uous places in the school district comply with the statute.
It is not essential that such notices be posted upon the
bulletin boards or places designated pursuant to section
k2Li.8, Comp. Laws 1913.
DECISION : Judgment affirmed for defendants.
(c )

Knudson v . Norman School District,

Trai11 County.
Not pertinent to this study.
Key 97 (k'k)»

Proceedings to determine validity of

bonds.
Key 97 (5).

Sale or other disposition of bonds by

district.
Key 97 (6).
(a)

Form, execution, and issuance of bonds.
Schouwei1er v. A1 len.

For brief see ante Key 97 (1), Case (b).

Rule

applies also to this Key section.
(b)

State

V.

School Di strict N o . 50 of

Barnes County.
For brief, see ante Key 97 (2), Case (a).

Rule

applies also to this section.
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Key 97 (8).
( a)

Ratification and estoppel.
State v. School District N o . 50 of

Barnes County.
See annotation in (b) above.
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
The bonds in suit contain a recital to the effect that
they arc issued for the purpose of refunding present indebt
edness "as authorized by act of the legislative assembly ap
proved March 11, I8 8 7 ," Laws I8 8 7 , p. 39, c . 11, entitled
"AN act to provide for refunding the outstanding indebted
ness which existed prior to July 3 0 , I8 8 6 , of any incorpor
ated board of education or school district in the territory
of Dakota."

He Id. that such recital does not estop the

school district from urging the defense, even as against an
innocent purchaser, that such bonds were illegally issued.
Key 97 (9).

Payment,

No cases in North Dakota.
Key 97 (10).
(a)

Rights and remedies of holders.
State v. School Pistrlet N o . 50 of

Barnes County.
See Rule in Case (a). Key 97 ( 8) above.
Key 9 8 .

School taxes.

Key 99.

Power and duty to tax.
(a)

Jones v, Br1qhtwood Independent School

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

109

District No. 1.
For brief, see ante Key 22, Case (d).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
General statute regarding school district tax levies
he Id applicable to school district organized by act of ter
ritorial Legislature.

Comp. Laws Supp. 192$, sections 2079-

bl to 2079-bl3.
Key 100.

Purposes and grounds.
(a)

State v. Rasmus son.

( 191^.1)

300 N. W.

25 (71 N. D. 267)
FACTS : This is an action by plaintiff to command the
defendant to levy and extend against certain property taxes
to pay school's bond issue in fall.
RULE: The statute requiring that a tax sufficient to
pay bonds be levied upon taxable property in school district
must be read into the school bond contract.
D E C I S I : Affirmed for defendant.
(b)

State v. School Dist. N o . 50, Barnes

County.
For brief, see ante 97 (2), Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
A recital in school district bonds that they were
issued to refund present indebtedness as authorized by Act
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March 11, l88? (Laws 188?, p. 39, c , 11), does not stop the
district from urging the defense, even against an innocent
purchaser, that the bonds were Illegally issued.
(c )

Payne v. Board of Trustees of the

Teachers * Ins. and Retirement Fund.

( 19ii-8)

35 N. W.

2d 553 (72 N. D. 278)
FACTS ;

The plaintiff, William H, Payne, had been

engaged in teaching in the public schools for twenty-six
years, eighteen of which, including the last five years of
such service, were in the public schools of North Dakota and
in equivalent service of the army.

He completed the pay

ments of the assessments at the end of the school year 194546 but lacked one year of teaching in North Dakota.

He com

pleted such teaching service in the state about May 31,
1947; he was fifty-nine years old.

On August 27, 1947, he

wrote to the executive secretary of the Board and applied
for retirement under the provisions of Senate Bill 103 as
passed by the 1947 Legislature.
Senate Bill 103 became Chapter 165, S . L . 1047, Sec.
15-3928, 1947 Supp. NDRC 1943»

The Board refused to grant

the annuity provided by that chapter on the grounds that the
plaintiff had performed no teaching services after it became
effective.

The Board pointed out that he was entitled to

payments under the old law.

Plaintiff then brought this

suit to determine and enforce his claimed rights under the
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19^4-7 law*

Tlic Di st r ict Court round in his favor and the

Board brought this appeal.
The stipulated facts show that the plaintiff on May
3 1 > 1914.7 » had fully complied with the act and fulfilled all

the conditions therein.

By ceasing to teach he retired.

He

was at that time entitled to the deferred payments, in the
form of an annuity, provided by the Teachers* Insurance and
Retirement Act, for the services he had performed.

It became

the duty of the Board, as soon as requested, to determine
the amount of his annuity according to the law then in
force, and commence payments as of that date.
DECISION :

It follows that the plaintiff is only en

titled to receive annuities under Sec. 15-3928, 1914-7 Supp.
NDRC 1914.3 .
Judgment of the District Court is reversed in favor
of defendants, and remanded for further proceedings accord
ing to law.
Key 101.

Amount of tax.
(a )

(1919)

Great Northern R y . C o . v. Duncan.

176 N. W. 992 ( I4 2 N. D. 314-6)

FACTS ; The action is one to recover certain taxes
alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff under protest.
The facts alleged in the complaint may be briefly stated as
follows:

In the year 1915 the county auditor of Towner

County levied a mill tax for school purposes upon the

e
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property of the plaintiff, acting under the authority ex
pressed in section I22 I4., Comp, Laws 1913.
The tax is $111^.69 in excess of the amount which the
auditor would be authorized to levy under Chapter 2Sl^ of the
Session Laws of 191^, if the provisions of this chapter were
applicable and if the authority contained in section 122i^,
Compiled Laws of 1913, is restricted by the later enactment.
The tax was paid under protest.
RULE ;

Session Laws 1915» c . 25^1-» section 1, which

provides for limiting taxes levied at a certain rate in
mills during the years 191 5 - 1 6 , limits the taxes that may be
extended by the county auditor for school purposes, under
Comp. Laws 1913» section 122 I4..
DECISION ; Judgment affirmed for plaintiff.
(b)

State V. Kramer.

( 1922)

190 N. W. 2?1

(I4-9 N. D. 397)
FACTS;

The plaintiff and petitioner alleges, among

other things, that prior to the I5th day of August, 1922, a
special election was held in Devils Lake special school dis
trict for the purpose of authorizing a tax levy of 25 per
cent in excess of the limit otherwise provided by chapter
122 of the Session Laws of 1921» and that an election held
on August I5th resulted in a favorable vote on the proposi
tion; that the board of education thereupon, by resolution,
directed the levy of $ 1 7 ,0 0 0 for school purposes, which sum
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was within the 25 per cent increase authorized at the elec
tion; that upon certification of the levy to the county
auditor, the latter refused to extend the taxes.

Judgment

was brought in favor of the plaintiff.
RULE:

Session Laws 1921, c. 122, providing that the

total amiount of taxes levied for any purpose, except special
levies for local improvements and maintenance of sinking
funds in any county or political subdivision, or any vil
lage, town, or city within the state, shall not exceed any
amount equal to one-third of the total combined levies which
were made for the years 1918, 1919, and 1920, except that
school districts may levy not to exceed 30 per cent in ex
cess of such amount, and provided that any county or politi
cal subdivision, or any village, town, or city, may increase
such levy in same proportion as assessed property valuation
increases or has increased over that of year 1919, and pro
vided that the electors may by a majority vote authorize a
levy of 25 per cent in excess of this limit, held to author
ize electors of school districts by a majority vote to in
crease the tax levy above the limit otherwise prescribed.
D E C I S I Œ : Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Cc)

Great Northern Rv. C o . v. Severson.

County Treasurer.

( 19S D

50 N. W. 2d 689 (78 N. D.

610)

FACTS :

Plaintiff brought this action to recover
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money paid under protest as excess tax levies.

The clerk of

the school board of the district certified to the County
Auditor of Nelson County for the year 19ii.6 a levy of 33
mills, which was the maximum levy established by the elec
tors of the district at the special election in 19ii-6,
Despite the fact that no other election was held in the dis
trict, the clerk of the school board, for the year 19^.7,
certified a levy of 50.12 mills, which was ll{..12 mills in
excess of the 36-mill limitation established by Chapter 359,
SLND 19U-7-

This excess levy applied to valuation of plain

tiff’s property amounts to $903.85tiff sought to recover.

This amount the plain

The plaintiff did not contest the

right of the school district to levy 36 mills as prescribed
by Chapter 359, SLND 1914-7, but challenges the right of the
school district to use the right of the 191|-6 election and
the levy increase approved at that time as a basis for in
creasing the levy limit prescribed by that statute,
RULE ;

The 1914-7 amendatory statute which raised the

aggregate amount of tax that could be levied by any school
district giving four years of standard high school work
from 22 mills to 36 mills is prospective in its operation
and does not furnish an enlarged basis for applying the per
centage increase approved by the voters of a school district
at an election held when the prior levy limit of 22 mills
was in effect.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

115

DECISION ; Judgment affirmed for plaintiff.
Key 102.

Persons and property liability.
(a)

State v, Rasmusson.

For brief, see ante Key 100, Case (a).
Further ruling in case, pertinent to this Key sec
tion, as follows;
Where territory is detached from one school district
and organized into a new school district, tax levies by old
district for debt service do not follow detached territory
except as directed by an arbitration board under the statute
providing that the board shall take an account of the
assets, funds on hands, the debts Justly and properly be
longing to or chargeable to each corporation, or part of a
corporation affected by such change, and levy such tax
against each as will in its judgment justly and fairly
equalize their several interests.
Key 103.

Levy and assessment.

Key 103 (1).

Making requisites, and validity in

genera 1.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 103 (2).

Submission of question to voters.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key 103 (3).

Statement of purpose of tax.

No cases in North Dakota.
103 ( .

Certificates, estimates, and
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determination of rate or amount of levy.
(a)

State v. Kramer.

For brief, see ante Key 101, Case (b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
Session Laws 19IS, c . 11*4, providing that the board
of education shall, on or before the 20th day of July in
each year,

levy a tax for the support of the schools of the

corporation for the fiscal year next ensuing, held not ap
plicable as to the time of certification of the tax to the
county auditor to an additional tax authorized by the elec
tors, under Session Laws 1921, c, 122.
Key 104»

Lien.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 105.

Payment.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 106.

Correction and enforcement.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 107.

Remedies for erroneous taxation.
(a)

Great Northern R y . Co. v. Mustad,

County Auditor , et al.

( 194^)

33 N . W. 2d 436

(76 N. D. 84)
FACTS:

In this action the plaintiff entered a com

plaint showing that the school district had levied and ex
tended against the plaintiff's property an allegedly
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excessive tax on the theory that the vote of the electors of
the district to exceed the legal tax limit by 50 per cent
authorized a levy of tax 50 per cent in excess of legal tax
limit as increased by subsequent legislation, and that the
defendants had threatened to and would collect such tax if
not restrained.
HELD :

Railroad was not entitled to injunctive re

straining levy and collection of school district tax on its
personal property in excess of amount which district was
authorized to levy in absence of showing that exaction of
tax would result in irreparable injury to railroad, since
railroad had an adequate remedy at law by paying tax under
protest and suing to recover amount of illegal exaction.
Key 108.

Assessments and special taxes for particu

lar purposes.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 109.

Poll taxes.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 110.

Disposition of proceeds of taxes and other

revenues.
(a)

Stinson v. Thorson.

(1916)

158 N. W.

351 (3I4. N. D. 372)
FACTS ; This is an action to restrain the school
board of Grand Forks independent school district from carry-*
ing out a contract for the erection of a high school
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building, because certain funds had been diverted from the
purpose for which they had been levied, and that without
such funds said contract creates a debt in excess of the
constitutional limit.
RULE:

Transfer of funds from teachers' general fund

of independent school district is not prohibited by Const,
section 1 7 5 » relating to application of taxes.
DECISION :

Original judgment for plaintiffs is re

versed.
( b)

Gerhardt v. Heid.

For brief and decision, see ante Key 2, Case (a).
Key 111.

Rights and remedies of taxpayers.
(a )

No.

Anderson v. International School Dist.

Portal Township. Burke County.

For brief, see ante Key 90,

Case ( b).

Further ruling in the case,

pertinent to this Key

section, as follows:
Payments on contracts of a school district creating
a debt in excess of the five per cent limit prescribed by
Const, section l83, will be enjoined at the suit of a tax
payer.
( b)

Kretchmer v. School Board of Di st. N o .

12. Barnes County.
For brief, see ante Key 6?,

Case ( b),

Further ruling in the case,

pertinent to this Key
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section, as follows:
Evidence he Id to show establishment and attempt to
maintain high school by defendants without submission of
question to popular vote, as required by Comp. Laws 1913*
section 1192, so that injunction against such section is
authorized.
(c)

Shir lev v. Coal Field School Di st. No.

16. Divide County.
For brief, see ante Key 97 (2), Case (b).
Identical rule applies to this section.
(d)

Weeks v. Hetland.

(1925)

202 N. W.

807 (52 N. D. 351)
(e)

Beckman v. Bel yea.

( 1931)

236 N. W.

361 (60 N. D. 738)
(f)

Moots V. Belyea.

( 193D

236 N. W.

358
FACTS ; These arc ccsnpanion cases.

There were four

schools in the district and four teachers to employ.

At the

time the contract was entered into with Mary Moots to teach
school No. 2 as shown her case, the board employed Anna
Collins to teach school No. 1.

When the new board decided

"that Mary Moots was not legally hired and she should be
notified to that effect," it transferred Anne Collins to
«

school No, 2 and employed Signy K. Stoner to teach school
No. 1 in place of Anne Collins.

Contracts were signed for
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the term of nine months each, beginning September 8, 1930,
with agreed compensations, the teachers immediately took
charge of the schools, have been teaching there ever since
with the full consent and acquiescence of the school board
and under its direction, and there is no question raised as
to their competency.
The plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin the
school board from paying out any money to Anne Collins or to
Signy K, Stoner, from interfering with Mary Mootz as teacher
in school No, 2, and to compel them to observe the contract
set forth by Mary Mootz in her case against the school
board.
RULE;

Taxpayers held not entitled to enjoin school

board from preventing teacher alleged to have been validly
employed from carrying out contract by employing another
teacher; taxpayers held not entitled to enjoin school board
from paying teacher employed by board because of previous
employment by board’s predecessors of another teacher re
placed by second teacher.
DECISION :

Crosby.
FACTS :

Affirmed for defendants.
( g)

Simmons v. Board of Educat1on of

(193D

237 N. W. 700 ( 6l N. D. 212)

This action was brought by the plaintiff, a

theater operator, suing as an elector and a taxpayer in the
defendant school district to prevent school from renting the
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high school auditorium for theatrical entertainments.

The

District Court held that the provisions "shall apply only to
professional entertainers and shall not be considered as
restraining anyone connected with the defendant school or
its classes, chautauquas, local entertainments, athletic
contests, or those who are not professional entertainers."
The District Court rendered judgment on these points for the
plaintiff ; defendants appealed.
RULE ; Theater operator suing as taxpayer he Id not
entitled to enjoin school district’s officers from renting
out high school auditorium for theatrical entertainments
where there was no showing of injury to taxpayers.
DECISION : Judgment reversed in favor of defendants.
(h)

Jones v. Br iqhtwood Independent Schoo1

Dist. N o . 2*
For brief, see ante Key 22, Case (d).
Rule applies to this Key.
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CHAPTER VIII
CLAIMS AGAINST DISTRICTS, AND ACTIONS
Key 112.

Presentation and allowance of claims.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 113-

Actions by or against the district.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 11^..

Capacity to sue or be sued.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 115.

Rights of action and defenses.
(a)

Farmers * and Merchants * N at. Bank of

Val ley City v. School Dist. N o . 53.

N. W. 76?

(6 Dak. 255)
For brief, see ante Key 95 (1), Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
A school district, in an action against it on its
warrants, will be permitted to defend on the ground that the
warrants were issued in excess of its powers.
( b)

Ogren v. Crvsta1 Springs School Dist.

N o . 29. Kidder County.

( 1925)

203 N.

W. 321+ (52

N. D. 455)
FACTS :

This action may be and was considered as an

action for money had and received.

In his complaint the

plaintiff, generally setting out his version of the facts.
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alleges that he advanced the defendant the sum of $$,0 3 0 ;
that he received therefor a warrant for that amount ; that
the same was not paid for want of funds and was duly regis
tered; that the defendant received the money thus paid by
the plaintiff and used the same in the building of its
schoolhouses; that payment has been demanded but refused.
RULE: Action for money had and received may not be
maintained against a school district, to recover money un
lawfully borrowed by the treasurer of such district to re
place defalcations of the district’s funds, although money
was kept in Bank of North Dakota as required by Laws 1919,
c. li|.7.
DECISION : Verdict for plaintiff affirmed...plaintiff
should recover amount district actually received from him.
Key 116.

Time to sue and limitations.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 117.

Use of name of district or of officers.
No cases in North Dakota,

Key 118 .

Parties.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 119.

Process and appearance.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 120.

Pleading.
#

No cases in North Dakota.
Key 121.

Evidence.
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No cases in North Dakota.
Key 122.

Trial.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 1 2 3 .

Judgment.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 1 2 4 .

Execution and Judgment.
(a)

Auran v. Mentor SchooI District N o . _1

of Divide County.

( 1929)

228 N. W. 4 3 $ (58 N. D.

934)
FACTS I

In this action the plaintiff, having a judg

ment against the defendant. Mentor School District No. 1 and
the members of the board of education of the school dis
trict, caused an execution to be issued on the Judgment and
commenced a garnishment proceeding against Divide County,
the county auditor, and the county treasurer.

The garnish

ees appeared by the state’s attorney and objected to the
Jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the funds held
by the garnishees were held as a trust fund, and not subject
to execution, attachment, or garnishment.
RULE;

(1)

Public funds belonging to a school dis

trict are not subject to execution, attachment, or garnish
ment .
(2)

Judgment against a school district can be col

lected only under statute providing for levying taxes to pay
Judgment (Comp. Laws 1913, sections 1223^ 1227)*
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Key 125 .

Appeal and error.
No cases In North Dakota.

Key 126.

Costs.
No cases in North Dakota.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

CHAPTER IX
TEACHERS
Key 127.

Eligibility in general.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 128.

Teachers* institutes.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 129.

Certificate or license.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 1 3 0 .

In general.
(a)

McDonald v. Nielsen.

(1919)

175

N. W. 361 (I4.3 N. D. 3ij.6)
FACTS :

The plaintiff, who was then incumbent, and

the defendant were opposing candidates for the office of
superintendent of public instruction with the result that
the defendant won.

The plaintiff, however, refused to sur

render the office, contending that the defendant was not the
"holder of a teacher *s certificate of the highest grade
issued in the state," and hence was not eligible to the
office.
The defendant contended that she is "the holder of
such a certificate within the meaning of section 110^, Comp.
Laws 1 9 1 3 .

It appears from the record In this case that the

defendant on November 27» 1900, received from the then
superintendent of public instruction a normal certificate
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under the provisions of section 7 3 8 , Rev. Codes 1899.

The

result of the examination taken by her is indorsed on the
certificate.

The record also disclosed that on November 8,

190 2 , the then superintendent of public instruction issued

a professional certificate to the defendant.
RULE; Manifestly, the changes made in the former law
as disclosed by section 1105» Comp. Laws 1913* do not indi
cate any intention on the part of the legislature to dis
qualify those then holding a teacher *s certificate of the
highest grade issued in this state from holding the office
of superintendent of public instruction.
A professional certificate issued under the provi
sions of Rev. Codes 1899» section 737» is a "teacher’s cer
tificate of the highest grade" issued in the state within
the purview of Comp. Laws 1913» section 1105.
DECISION : Judgment affirmed for defendant.
( b)

Wendt v. Wal1er.

For brief, see Key if8 (2), Case (a).

Same rule

applies.
Key 131 .

Requisites to appointment or employment.
(a )

Goose River Bank v . Wi 1lowLake School.

For brief, see ante Key 95 (2), Case

(b). Same

rule

applies.
#

(b)

Hosmer v. SheIdon Schoo1 Dis trict N o .

2 ojT Ransom County.

( 1894)

59 N, W. 1035 (4 N. D.

197 )

.
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FACTS;

In this action judgnent was originally made

In favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant school district
appealed.

It appears from the complaint that on August 7,

1 8 9 1 * when the written contract between the plaintiff and

the defendant was entered into, the plaintiff held a first
grade certificate issued by the superintendent of Barnes
County.

This certificate would be valid in Hanscan County

when indorsed by the superintendent of schools of Ransom
County.
1891.

Such indorsement was not made until September I4.,
The allegation is that it was made August 29, 1891,

and the formal entry September ij..

But it was the formal

entry that constituted the indorsement, and what preceded
that was but a promise to indorse.

Hence, neither at the

time of entering into the contract, nor at the time of com
mencing to teach, did the plaintiff hold a certificate in
Ransom County.

For that reason the defendant contends that

the contract of employment, dated August 7> 1891, was void
under section 122, c. 62, Laws 1890, as amended by section
2lj., c. 56, Laws I8 9 1 .
RULE:

(1)

A contract duly executed between the

proper officers of a school district and another person, by
the terms of which said person is employed as a teacher in
a public school in the district, is void where such person,
at the time of making the contract, holds no certificate of
authority to teach in the county vrtiere the district is
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located.
(2)

The subsequent procurement of such certificate

will not enable such person to recover against the district
damages for the breach of such contract.
DECISION : Judgment reversed in favor of defendant.
(c)

Schafer v. Johns ( 1912)

137 N. W. 14.81

( 2 3 N. D. 593)

FACTS:

From a verdict in favor of the defendant the

plaintiff appealed.

At the time the plaintiff entered upon

a contract with the school board to teach in the school dis
trict he did not possess a certificate of qualification.
However, he was duly elected by the school board and signed
a contract ; later the school board declared the contract
void because he had not received a qualifying certificate at
the time of the signing of the contract.

Again, as In the

preceding case, the plaintiff did receive a qualifying cer
tificate to teach,
RULE : (We note In this case that there Is a revision
In law which holds differently than In the case preceding,)
Under the school law, as revised and re-enacted by
Laws 1911 , c. 266, a contract between a school board and a
teacher Is not void or voidable merely because at its date
the teacher did not hold a certificate or permit qualifying
*

him to teach,
DECISION : Judgment reversed In favor of plaintiff.
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Key 1 3 2 .

Revocation.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 1 3 3 .

Selection, appointment, and term of employ

ment in general.
Rules of board of education, see ante Key 55.
(a)

Mootg V. BeIvea.

For brief, see ante Key 111 (f).
(b)

Beckman v. BeIvea.

For brief, see ante Key 111, Case (c).
Further ruling in case, pertinent to this Key sec
tion, as follows:
School board’s formal approval of previous informal
employment of teacher constitutes ratification of employ
ment .
(c )

Seher v. Wpodlawn School Dist. N o , 26,

Kidder County.
FACTS :

( 1953)

59 N. W. 2d 805

Inasmuch as this case received broad publici

ty in North Dakota, and because it provides for broad appli
cation, it shall be discussed at length with rulings appli
cable here and in sections following.
This is a teacher's action for breach of teaching
contract consisting of his dismissal prior to expiration of
contractual term wherein defendant contended that dismissal
had been for cause.

The district court entered Judgment for

the plaintiff, and defendant appealed.

The Supreme Court
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held that the evidence sustained the determination of the
trial Judge that plaintiff had not been guilty of plain
violation of contract, gross immorality, or flagrant neglect
of duty.
RULE; A school teacher, including a superintendent,
employed by school district is not an "officer" of the dis
trict, but is a mere "employee," and relationship between
district and teacher is purely contractual.
Key 1314..

Contracts of employment.
No cases in North DeiKota.

Key 135-

Making, requisites, and validity.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 135 ( 1 ). Authority to contract in general.
(a)

Auran v. Mentor School Di strict N o . 2.»

Divide County.
For brief, see ante Key 121*., Case (a).

Same rule

applies.
Key 135

Authority to bind successors.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 135 ( 3 ).

Requisites and validity in general.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key 135 (I4.).

Formal requisites.

(a ) Michae1sohn v. Norway Schoo1 Distrlet
N o . 12 of McHenry County.

( 1933)

2i|.9 N. W. 776

( 6 3 N. D. 6 8 3 )

«
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FACTS ; This is an action to recover damages for the
refusal of the defendant school corporation to execute a
teacher’s contract with the plaintiff.

The contract was

oral, and the defendant declined to execute a contract in
writing, and later would not allow the plaintiff to enter
upon the performance of his oral contract.
RULE ;

Statutory requirement that contracts for em

ployment of teachers be in writing held mandatory barring
teacher’s action for damages against school district based
on oral contract of employment.

Until a contract for the

employment of the teacher has been entered in the manner re
quired by the statute, no binding contract is formed which
can be used as the basis of an action for damages against
the district.

(Comp. Laws 1913, section 1178)

DECISION : Affirmed for defendant.
Key 135 (5).

Ratification and estoppel.

No cases for North Dakota.
Key 136.

Construction and operation.
(a)

Auran v. Mentor School Distri ct N o .

Divi de County.
For brief, see ante Key 12i|., Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
Teacher cannot employ, nor require school board to
accept, substitute In performance of services she contracted
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to perform.
( b)

Seher v. Woodlawn School Dist. N o . 26

of Kidder County.
For brief, see ante Key 133» Case (c).
Ruling pertinent to this Key section follows:
The laws in existence when contract is entered into
become a part of the contract, as though written therein,
and, therefore, statutory provision that school board could
dismiss teacher at any time for certain causes became part
of teacher *s contract.
Key 137*

(NDRC 19l*.3» 15-2508)

Performance or breach.
(a)

Auran v. Mentor School District No . _1.

For brief, see Key 111, Case Ce).
Key 138 .

Remedies for enforcement.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 13 9 .

Resignation and abandonment.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 1^0.

Suspension, removal, and reassignment.
No cases listed for North Dakota.

Key II4.I.

In general.

Key 11+.1 (2).

Authority to remove or discharge in

genera 1.
No cases for North Dakota.
Key 141 ( 3 ).

Contracts reserving right.

No cases in North Dakota.
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Grounds for removal or suspension.

(a)
District No. 20*
FACTS ;

Clark v. Wi Id Rose S p e d a 1 Scho
182 N. W. 307 ikl N. D. 297)

On April 22, 1919, at a special meeting of

the school board, the board discussed the advisability of
dismissing the plaintiff for voluntary neglect of work by
not reporting for duty on the preceding day, which was Mon
day.

The clerk was authorised to deliver a communique to

her, and with it a warrant for her salary to date.

On the

following day, no resignation having been received, the
board held another special meeting, at which it was resolved
that the plaintiff be dismissed from her position for the
good of the district.

A communication to this effect was

authorized, in which it was stated that the dismissal should
take effect immediately, and that the notice was given by
virtue of plaintiff *s refusal to hand in her resignation as
requested.
On the above facts the district court was called upon
to determine whether or not the plaintiff had been legally
dismissed and removed under subdivision 8 of section 1 2 5 1 »
Comp. Laws 1913.
RULE;

Where a board of education of a special school

district undertakes to dismiss and remove a school teacher
under subdivision 8 of section 1251» Compiled Laws of 1913»
which provides for removal "for cause," It is prerequisite
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to a valid removal that the teacher be informed of the
charges and be given reasonable opportunity for a hearing
thereon,
DECISION ; Judgment for plaintiff,
C b)

26

Seher v. Woodlawn Schoo1 Distrlet No.

.

For brief, see ante Key 133» Case (c).
Ruling pertinent to this Key section, as follows:
(1)

A school board's dismissal of a teacher is an

exercise of executive function, but whether dismissal con
stituted a breach of teacher's contract is for Judicial de
termination, and, therefore, decision of school board, which
had dismissed teacher prior to termination of contractual
term, that there was cause for dismissal was not final or
controlling upon court in teacher's action for breach of
teaching contract.
(2)

(NDRC 1943# 12-500)

Public school education is a governmental,

rather than a proprietary, function and legislature may de
clare that question of facts as to whether there is cause
for dismissing a teacher shall be administrative rather than
a judicial question.
Key 141 (5)«
(a)
No. 22.

(NDRC 1943, 12-506)
Proceedings and review,
McWi thy v. Heart River School Di strict

32 N. W. 2d 686 (75 N. D. 744)

R. C. 1943,

15 -2 5 0 8 , 15 -2 5 0 9 , 15-3615-16.
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FACTS:

The plaintiff brought this action for a bal

ance she claims due under a contract with the defendant
school district.

The contract is admitted.

It provided

that plaintiff should teach the school for eight months.
She was paid her salary from September 11, 191*4, until
December 1, 1944.

During those three months eight children

were in attendance, only seven of whom were of compulsory
school age.

They belonged to two families and were all the

children of school age in the district.

One of these fami

lies was that of the president of the school board.

The

evidence shows that the plaintiff had some difficulties with
discipline in her school.

In early November she got into a

dispute with the son of the president of the school board
over a matter of history in which she was clearly right.
The son defied her.

The father took the son *s part.

About

the 11th of November he took his three children out of
school and sent them to another school.

He also visited the

father of the other family attending school, and told him to
keep his children out "for ten days— enough days so the con
tract of the teacher would be void."

Then on November 29

the school board met and passed a resolution closing the
school on the grounds that the attendance was less than six
for ten consecutive days.

The evidence does not show that

the plaintiff was notified thereof.

Shortly after the ten

days had expired the five children belonging to the other
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family returned to school.

Plaintiff continued to teach

them the rest of the term.

In that she was not disturbed,

although the president of the school board knew that she was
teaching.

She reported to the county superintendent.

Her

pupils took the required examinations and passed.
The evidence indicates clearly that the cause of the
attempted closing of the school was the dissatisfaction of
the president of the school board, with plaintiff *s conduct
of the school and the progress of his children under plain
tiff’s teaching.
RULE ;

Proceeding to dismiss teacher for failure to

perform her duty or to remove her for inccxnpetency must be
brought under statutory provision for revocation of teach
er’s certificate for incompetency or provision for dismissal
of teacher for violation of contract or neglect of duty
after hearing and notice to teacher in sufficient time to
prepare defense, not under statute providing for discontinu
ance of school when average attendance falls below six
pupils for ten consecutive days.

(R. C. 19i|-3» l$-2^08,

15 -2 5 0 9 , 15-3615, 15-3616)

DECISION ;

Case remanded with directions to district

court to order judgment for the balance due on the contract.
(b)

Clark V. W i Id Rose SpeciaI School
e

Di strict N o . 9 0 .
For brief, see ante Key lij.1 (if). Case (a).
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Further ruling in case, pertinent to this Key section,
as follows:
Where a board of education of a special school dis
trict undertakes to dismiss and remove a school teacher
under Comp. Laws 1913, section 1251* subdivision 8 , which
provides for removal "for cause," it is prerequisite to a
valid removal that the teacher be informed of the charges
and be given a reasonable opportunity for a hearing thereon.
(c )

Seher v. Vfoodlawn School District

No. 26.
For brief, see ante Key 133* Case (c).
Ruling pertinent to this Key section, as follows:
Statutes providing for review by superintendent of
public instruction of decisions of county superintendent of
schools was not intended to apply in case of dismissal of
school teacher, and, therefore, appeal to superintendent of
public instruction by teacher who was dismissed prior to
termination of contractual period was not a condition pre
cedent to commencement of action for breach of teacher*s
contract.

(NDRC 1914-3* 15-2107* 15-221?)

Key II4.I ( 6 ).

Reinstatement.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key II4 2 .

Actions for damages.
(a)

Seher v. Woodlawn Schoo1 Dis trict

No. 2 6 ,
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For brief, see ante

133, Case (c).

Further rulings in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
(1)

See ruling for this case above. Key li^-l (5>),

Case (c),
(2)

See ruling for this case above. Key II4.I (U-),

Case ( b)•
(3)

Burden of proof is upon school district in

action by school teacher for breach of contract based upon
dismissal of teacher prior to expiration of contractual
period to prove by fair preponderance of evidence that the
school board had justifiable cause for such dismissal, and
fact of dismissal is no evidence that it was justifiable.
Where teacher was dismissed without cause before ex
piration of term of his employment, was paid to date of dis
missal, and suit for breach of teacher *s contract resulting
from dismissal was not tried until term of employment had
expired, amount recoverable by teacher was the contract
price, less what he earned, or by reasonable diligence could
have earned, subsequent to his discharge.
2107

(NDRC 19^.3, 1^-

, 15 -2 2 1 7 , 15 -2 5 0 8 )
Key II1.3 .

Compensation.
No cases in North Dakota,

Key 1144.

In general.
No cases in North Dakota.

«
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Key ll|i^ ( 1 ) .

Right to compensation in general.

No cases in North Dakota,
Key lijii. (2),

Effect of closing school because of

contagious disease.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key lijj^. (3)-

Effect of removal, suspension, or

abandonment of employment.
(a )

McWithy v. Heart River School Di str ict

No. 22.
For brief, see ante Key li|.l (5)» Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section, as fol
lows :
A teacher receiving no notice of district school
board's resolution discontinuing school taught by her be
cause of average attendance of less than six pupils for ten
consecutive days, was justified in continuing to teach five
children, returning after such time, with belief that clos
ing of school was abandoned, and was entitled to her salary
for whole school term under teaching contract.
Key II1J4. (fj.) .

Rate or amount of compensation.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key li+li- (5).

Payment, and orders therefor.

No cases in North Dakota.
Key li^.5.

Actions.
(a )

MeWithy v. Heart River Schoo1 Di strict
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No.

22.

For brief, see ante Key H 4.I (5), Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section, as fol
lows :
In action against school district for balance due
teacher under contract for services rendered after passage
of school board *s resolution closing school on ground of in
sufficient attendance, district school board, attempting to
show an affirmative defense that it acted under statute, had
burden of showing by preponderance of evidence that proper
and convenient school facilities for pupils were furnished
in another school as required by statute.

(R. C. 19li.3» 15-

2509 .)
Key lif.6 .

Pensions.
(a)

(37 N. D. 583)

State v. Hauqe.

(1917)

1614. N. W. 289

L. R. A. 191ÔA, 522.

FACTS ; The purpose of this action is to test the
validity of the so-called Teachers* insurance and Retirement
Act.

It is based on appeal from a Judgment directing and

commanding the defendant, as county treasurer of Ransom
County, to set aside from the county tuition fund a sum
equal to ten cents for each child of school age and to
transmit the same to the state treasurer, as required by
section 1515 of the Compiled Laws of 1913, as amended by
chapter II4.O of the Laws of 1915.

#
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The defendant and appellant contends that the act,
though attempting to create a teachers* insurance and re
tirement fund, does not provide for the levy of the tax
directly, but attempts to reach into a fund created for
another purpose to carry out its object.

He submits that a

person teaching in one part of the state is not giving his
services to the support of schools in another part of the
state, or in other words, funds raised by taxation for the
support of schools in one county are used for past or pres
ent services performed in another county, and this he claims
cannot be done.
RULE;

There being no constitutional requirement that

taxes levied for general public purpose must be disbursed in
taxing district, there can be no objection to Comp. Laws
1 9 1 3 » section 1515* as amended by Laws 1915* c .1^0,

viding

pro

for a teachers' pension fund, as taxes arecollected

throughout the state and pensions are not always paid to
teachers residing in the taxing district,
DECISION ;

Affirmed in favor of plaintiff.

The es

tablishment of state teachers' pension fund is a public pur
pose and enterprise, within the power of the Legislature.
( b)

Payne v . Board of Trustees of the

Teachers' Insurance and Retirement Fund.
For brief, see ante Key 100, Case I c ).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
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section, as follows:
(1)

Relation between teachers and state retirement

fund is contractual in nature, and principles of law govern
ing contracts apply as far as possible.

(R. C. 19W

and

1914.7 Supp., section 15-3901 et seq.)

(2)

Teacher upon entering service of teaching ac

cepts provisions of Teachers* Insurance and Retirement Act,
and by continued teaching and payment of assessments for 25
years performs obligations imposed thereby, relation thus
arising being subject only to such limited modification pro
vided for or inherent in laws to maintain the fund in such
condition that intent of the statute to encourage persons to
enter and remain in teaching profession may be obtained.
(See citation at end of preceding paragraph.)
(3)

Where teacher completed service on May 31» 1914.7*

at the age of 59 years after teaching required number of
years in state public schools, teacher became eligible for
annuity under the Teachers* Insurance and Retirement Act,
the amount thereof to be measured by terms of the statute in
effect on May 31» rather than under the statute which went
into effect on July 1, 1914-7» notwithstanding teacher’s ap
plication for annuity was not made until August I9 I4.7 .
(R. C. I9 I4.3 and 1914-7 Supp., sections 15-3901 et seq., 153928, 15 - 3 9 3 0 .)
(c)

State ex re 1. Chamber lain v. Johnstone.
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262 w. w. 193 (65 N. D. 727)

et al.,

( 1935)

FACTS :

The relator is a school teacher who "after

more than fifteen years of service as a teacher in the pub
lic schools of this State had elapsed” was suffering from a
permanent disability which she suffered on March 11, 1929,
The permanent character of her disability was determined
under the provisions of subdivision 2 of section I5l8, Comp.
Laws, as amended by chapter 161, section 6, Sess. Laws of
1919.

She says that she is entitled to annuity payable from

and after the date of her disability, rather than from and
after the time when she completed payment on her assess
ments.
RULE :

Disabled teacher he id required to pay into

Teachers' Insurance and Retirement Fund full amount of all
statutory assessments before being entitled to share in
fund, and when, after disability is suffered, there is an
amount due on such assessments, right to annuity does not
accrue until deficiency in assessments is paid, and does not
relate back to date of disability.

(Comp, Laws 1913* sec

tions 1 5 0 4 » 1 5 2 2 , and sections I5l8> subd. 2, 1521, as
amended by Laws 1919, c . 161, sections 6, 6, and section
1 5 2 4 * as amended by Laws 1919 * c . I6 I, section 10.)

(d )

Barrett v . Board of Trustees of Teach

ers* Insurance and Retirement Fund.

(1952)

576.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

55 N, W.
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FA.CTS î The plaint iff is more than 55 years of age
and has been a teacher in the public schools of North Dakota,
as the term teaching is defined in section 15-3901, NDRC
191+3, since the year 1901.

Several years prior to July 1,

191+7, she had completed 25 years of teaching in the public
schools of this state and had paid into the Teachers* Insur
ance and Retirement Fund the assessments necessary to make
her eligible for retirement under the provisions of the act
which is now Chapter 15-39, NDRC 191+3 and supplement there
to, but she continued to teach.
For more than five years next preceding August 15,
I9 I+7 , she was employed as Deputy County Superintendent of
Schools in and for Stutsman County, during which time she
paid an assessment into Fund from her salary.

On August 15,

191+7 , she retired from that office and applied for retire

ment under the provisions of the Act.
The defendants refused to grant the petition of the
plaintiff for pension or annuity under Chapter 165, SLND
I9 I+7 , for the reason that she had not been employed as a
teacher for a term comprising a school year subsequent to
July 1, 191+7 , the effective date of Chapter 165.

The period

of her teaching service after the effective date of the new
statute was from July 1 to August 15, 191+7, or approximately
*

six weeks.
RULE ; Where teacher had been employed as public
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school teacher, or equivalent thereof, from 1901 to August
1 5 » 1914.7 » and, prior to July 1, 19k7, had qualified for re

tirement benefits under the 1914-3 act, but had spent last
five years as acting county superintendent of schools,
teacher had continued to teach within the meaning of the
1949 retirement act and, upon payment of additional assess

ments from her wages, was entitled to qualify under the new
retirement act which became effective after July 1, 191+7.
(NDRC I9 I4.3 , 1 5 -3 9 0 1 et seq., 15-3927, 15-3928, as amended by
Laws 191+7 , c. 165; NDRC 191+9 Supp. 15-3928.)
Key 11+7.

Duties and liabilities.
No cases in North Dakota.
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CHAPTER X

PUPILS AND CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE OF SCHOOLS
Key II4.8 .

Nature of right to instruction in general.
No cases for North Dakota.

Key 1 4 9 .

Eligibility.

Key 153*

Residence.
(a)

of Fargo.

( I8 8 8 )

Gardner v. Board of Education of C
38 N. W. k33 (5 Dak. 259)

FACTS; This is an action in which the plaintiff
claimed for his children the school privileges due a resi
dent of a certain city.

He owns a farm which has been his

domicile, takes his family and part of his furniture to the
city during the winter, for the purpose of giving his family
the social and school advantages, and lives there in a
rented house, employing a hired man to take care of his farm
while the family is absent.

He returns with his family and

furniture each spring to carry on the farm.

He has voted

unchallenged at an election in the city; he has also been a
town officer where the farm is situated.
RULE ;

In determining the true residence,choice

an element to be considered, but itis inferior

is

in weight

to

tangible acts indicating residence.
#
DECISION :

Judgment affirmed for the defendants.

Farmer’s legal residence continues to be at the farm.

#
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(b)

Todd V. Board of Education of City of

Wi 1 1 1 ston.
For brief, see ante Key 20,

Case (a).

Further ruling in the case,

pertinent to this Key

section, as follows:
Governing board of receiving district, to whose high
school nonresident pupils apply for admission, has discre
tion to determine iidiether facilities warrant their admission,
and such determination will not be disturbed by courts, ex
cept by manifest abuse.

(Laws 1921, c, 107î Laws 1925» c.

189; Comp. Laws 1913, sections 1179, 1251 » subsec, II4., 1300 .)
Key 154'

Assignment or admission to particular

schools•
(a)

Todd V, Board of Education of Clty of

Vfi 1li ston.
For brief, see ante Key 20, Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows :
Where high school district already had so many non
resident pupils that buildings were overcrowded and teachers
overloaded, excluding further pupils from high school by
school board was not discriminating.
1 2 5 1 » subsec.

(Ccanp, Laws 1913» sec.

1 1 .)

( b)

State V. Aigulst.

9 5 2 (59 N. D. 762)

( 1930)

A. L, R. 4 9 4 .
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FACTSî

The defendants are residents of West Fargo

school district, a common school district which contains no
high school.

Children of the defendants have finished the

eighth grade in their district and attend the high schools
of Fargo, an independent school district organized under a
special statute of the territorial Legislature of 188$ and
governed by the board of education of the city of Fargo.
This board of education by appropriate resolution had de
clared that all nonresident pupils may not attend its school
without paying $100 per year for tuition, and charged the
children of the defendants this sum.

The defendants, as the

board of directors of West Fargo school district, offer to
pay the sum of $1.50 per week for tuition and no more.

The

schools of the city of Fargo do not receive any aid from the
state of North Dakota under the provisions of sections llj.30 114.3 8 , Compiled Laws of 1915 (section ll|.33 of Supp. 1925) and

"are not in fact supervised, governed and inspected by the
officials and departments of the State of North Dakota men
tioned, in the said acts of its legislature."
RULE ; High school in special district, not super
vised by state department of public instruction nor receiv
ing state aid, he Id not "standardized high school" within
statute relating to admission of nonresident pupils.
Laws 1925 # sections 114.38 a 1- 114.38 a 3 .)
DECISI ON : Affirmed for plaintiffs.

*
R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

(Comp.

15 0

Key 1 5 5 .

Proceedings to compel admission.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 156-157(a)

Health regulations in general.
Martin v. Craig.

(1919)

173 N. W.

787 ( 4 2 N. D. 2 1 3 )

FACTS !

The plaintiff and appellant is the legal cus

todian of two children of school age, and he petitioned to
compel the defendants to admit them to school.

The defend

ants Justify the refusal on the ground that one of the chil
dren had been found by a reputable physician and by a quali
fied representative of the Federal health service to be
afflicted with trachoma, a disease of the eyes which is com
municable and of a very serious nature, frequently resulting
in blindness.
RULE:

An order by a county board of health, requir

ing school officers to exclude from the schools children
affected or suspected of being affected with trachoma, he Id
reasonable.
DECISION :

Affirmed for defendants.

Key 158 (1).
(a )

Vaccination in general.
Rhea v. Board of Educat ion of Devi Is

Lake Specia1 School Distrlet.
For brief, see ante Key 55» Case (b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
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Comp. Laws 1913, section 1^25* providing for vaccina
tion of minors, and section 1^26, entamcrating causes for
which children may be excluded from schools, but not ex
press ly Including nonvaccination, construed together, do not
permit exclusion on sole ground of nonvaccination.
Key 159.

Payment of tuition.
(a)

State v. Va 1ley City Special School

District.
For brief, see ante Key 11, Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
Laws 1915, c . ÎI4 2 , relating to payment of tuition by
school districts for students or pupils attending any school
connected with the State University, or other higher insti
tution of learning, wherein students or members of the
faculty of such University or other institution teach, he Id
not unconstitutional as violating Const, sections 152 and

I5il-.
( b ) Todd V. Boar d of Educ at ion of Ci ty of
Wi 1li ston.
For brief, see ante Key 2 0 , Case (a).
Further ruling in this case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
Tuition charge imposed upon nonresident pupils ad
mitted to high school must be alike to all (Laws 1921,
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c. 107j Laws 192$, c. 189; Comp. Laws 1913, sections 1179,
1251 j subscc. lif., 1 3 0 0 ).
(c)

State V, Alqttist.

For brief, see ante Key l$l4-. Case (b).
Further ruling in this case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
School district not having required high school
course held not obligated to pay tuition of its pupils
attending high school other than "standardised high school”
(Comp. Laws Supp. 1925» sec. Ii*.38a2).
(d )

Anderson v . Breithbarth. ( 1933)

2i*.5

N. W. I4.63 (62 N. D. 7 0 9 )
FACTS :

For our purposes, it need only be stated that

this case requires a definition of the phrase "residing in
the district," as used in section 1343 of the Supplement,
which says:

"The public schools provided for in this chap

ter (sections 1105-1422 of the Compiled Laws of 1913) shall
be at all times equally free, open and accessible to all
children over six and under twenty-one years of age residing
in the district."
Because plaintiff*s parents arc separated, she has by
her wishes, and with the consent of her mother, come to the
school district to live with her aunt and uncle, and has
been a member of their family ever since, and has been
treated as such.
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RULE ;

Phrase "residing in district," within statute

declaring schools free, is not restricted to parents' domi
cile, but means actual residence of child.

Child of non

resident parents, living as member of aunt's family In local
school district, held "residing in district" within statute
declaring schools free.

(Comp. Lavrs Supp. 1925, section

1314.
3 .)
(e)

Batty v. Board of Education of City of

Wi 1liston.
For brief, see ante Key 11, Case (b).

Same rule

applies.
Under statute, school board held without power to im
pose tuition charge on resident pupil of school age vAio has
failed to complete high school course within prescribed time
on account of indifference and indolence, notwithstanding
that school board has wide discretion in management of
schools.

(Comp. Laws 1913, sections 1229-1285, 1251, sub

sec. 11, 1343; Laws 1935, c . 260; Const, section 147 et seq.)
Key 159^.

Transportation of pupils to and from

schools or provisions in lieu of.
(a)

State v. Mostad.

( 1914)

148 N. W.

831 (28 N. D. 244)
FACTS: This is an action to compel the school board
#

to furnish transportation for the children of the petitioner
to and from a certain school located in school district
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No, 10, Ward County.

The petitioner’s children were boys

from 10 to 19 years of age who had to cross a frozen river
and walk a distance of from one-fourth to one-third of a
mile to meet a team which had been sent for the children of
two other families who lived about a mile further on.

The

river was reasonably passable for pedestrians, and all three
families lived beyond the two-and-a-half-mile limit and
needed to be accommodated.

For the team to have picked up

the petitioner's children would have required it to go two
miles out of its way to a bridge; also extra expense would
have been involved,
RULE ;

Under Laws 1911# c . 266, section 232, trans

portation must be furnished to children living more than two
and a half miles from the district school, regardless of
whether or not the district is consolidated.
DECISION ;

In a reversal of the trial court judgment

for plaintiff, the Supreme Court judgment he Id that it is
not "an unjust or illegal discrimination," nor "a denial of
transportation," to require the children of the petitioner
to walk the short distance across the river to meet the
team.

Judgment for the defendants.
( b)
Ne Ison County.
FACTS;

the sum of

Eastgate v. Osago Schoo1 District of
( 19 19 )

171 N . W, 96 (i+l N. D. 5l8)

This is an action by the plaintiff to recover
for conveying his children from his home to
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one of the schools of the district located at the village of
Pekin, in said district, during the school years of 191 2 ,
1913, 191i|-, and 1915.

The school is alleged to be a dis

tance of five miles by the nearest route from the residence
of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff testifies there was a

school two miles south of them, which was three and a fourth
miles by the nearest travelled route.
. RULE;

(1)

Under Laws 1911» c . 266, section 232,

subd. I4., as amended by Laws 1913» c . 26?, and Laws 1915»
c. lU-l, imposing duty upon school boards to require children
between the ages of six and 15 to attend public schools, and
to provide transportation for such children who reside be
yond district prescribed by law, it is the duty of the
school board to ascertain what children within district re
side beyond such distance from the school and convey them to
schoo 1 .
(2)

Where the school board neglects or fails to fur

nish transportation to children between the ages of six and
15

years, in disregard of law, and the parent

or guardian

of any such children convejs them to the nearest public
school in the district by the nearest way, and such service
is accepted by the school district, it Is under implied con
tract to compensate him therefor.
(3)

The words "nearest route," as used in Laws 1911,

c. 266, section 232, subd. I4., as amended by Laws 1913,
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Cm 2 6 7 , and Comp. Laws 1913, section 131*2, as amended and
re-enacted by Laws 1915» c . II4.I, relating to transportation
of pupils living a certain distance from schools by the
nearest route, mean the nearest public route or one which
has been duly authorized or exists by law.
(c)

Sandrv v, Brooklyn School Pist. N o . 78

of WI lliams County.
kkk)

( 1921)

182 N. W. 689 (l*-7 N. D.

15 A. L. R. 719

FACTS :

In an action brought by a driver to recover

the compensation stipulated in a driver *s contract with a
school district for the transportation of teachers and
pupils to and from a consolidated school, \diere plaintiff
seeks to recover upon his own contract and upon claims aris
ing under three similar contracts of which he is assignee,
for a period of 13 weeks, during which the school was closed
on account of an epidemic of influenza, it is held:
RULE:

The driver's contract is not so far analogous

to a teacher's contract that the driver, upon showing readi
ness to perform during a period when the school Is closed on
account of an epidemic, may recover the agreed compensation
as upon full service performed.
(d)

Seller v. Gelhar.

(1926)

209 N. W.

376 (54 N. D. 245)
FACTS :

This action relates to the transportation of

pupils to and from a consolidated school.

The plaintiff is
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the father of a girl under 11 years of age.

Prior to con

solidation there was a school within three-fourths of a mile
from his home.

During the first two years after the girl

became of school age, the district provided vehicular trans
portation for her to and frcm the consolidated school, but
in 1923 the practice was discontinued.

The reason assigned

for ceasing to operate the bus was that the plaintiff’s
child was the only person of school age in that part of the
district and that, consequently, the cost of furnishing ac
tual transportation was greater than the district board felt
it could justifiably incur.

The plaintiff is 71 years old.

He testifies that it is impossible for him to transport his
daughter to school; that, as a result, his child is being
deprived of the educational advantages to which she is en
titled under the Constitution and the laws of this state.
RULE: Statute providing for transportation of pupils
of consolidated schools, does not deprive children or guard
ians of any constitutional rights merely because option as
to furnishing transportation or paying compensation therefor
lies within discretion of school board or in judgment of
people through election (Comp. Laws 1913, section 13U.3, and
section 1190, as amended by Laws 1921, c. 113; Laws 1919
(Sp. Sess.), c. 53, amending Laws 1919, c. 199, and Laws
1915 , c. 127; Const, sections II4.7 -lij-9 ).

DECISION : Judgment affirmed for defendants.

#

.
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(e)

Monke v. Iowa School District N o . ^ of

Hettinger County.

( 1927)

215 N. W. 2Bk ( 55 N. D.

809)
FACTS ;

This action is brought by the parent of a

school child to recover transportation under the compulsory
attendance statute as it was amended in 1917» Session Laws
1 9 1 7 » c, 2 0 6 .

In the trial court the plaintiff had Judgment

for an amount calculated upon the basis of the number of
days the child was actually transported by the parent in
three years at the rate of 35 cents per day, as fixed by the
school board.

From this Judgment the plaintiff has appealed,

and assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to enter
Judgment based upon the number of days the child attended
school rather than the number of days the plaintiff fur
nished transportation.
RULE;

Parent, entitled to compensation for trans

porting pupil to school, cannot recover for days child at
tended school when not transported (Comp. Laws 1913, section
13i+2, as amended by Laws 1917, c . 206).
DECISION :

Affirmed for defendant.
(f)

Sioux County.
FACTS :

Parrish v, Menz School District N o .
(1929)

223 N. W. 2Qk (57 N. D. 6 I6 )

This is an appeal from a Judgment in favor of

the plaintiff in an action to recover for transportation
furnished a pupil attending school.

The child of the

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

159

plaintiff was of compulsory school age, and the plaintiff
was responsible for her attendance at school.
a farm in the defendant school district.

They lived on

The plaintiff had

transported the child to and from school for 169 days, such
school being maintained in a common school district adjacent
to the defendant school district and being more than two
miles and a quarter distant from the plaintiff’s dwelling
house.

The officers of the defendant school district ar

ranged for such attendance and paid tuition in the adjoining
district for the plaintiff’s child but refused to provide
for transportation or to compensate the plaintiff therefor.
The nearest school in the defendant school district was ap
proximately five miles from the plaintiff’s home.

The trial

court found the reasonable value of the transportation to be
25 cents a day, the minimum fixed by statute, and judgment
was entered accordingly,
RULE : ( 1)

Officers of common school district may

arrange for paying transportation of pupils to attend school
in another district (Comp. Laws 1913, section 1 1 7 9 ).
(2)

Obligation of common school district to furnish

transportation is not limited to pupils attending school
within district (Comp. Laws Supp, 1925, section 131^2).
DECISION ; Judgment affirmed for plaintiff.
( g)

McWithy v. Heart River School Dist.

No. 22.

«
R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

•

160

For brief, see ante Key 11^.1 (5), Case (a).
Further ruling in this case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows;
A district school board must furnish adequate, con
venient, and proper facilities for every child of school age
in district, though it closes school district, as authorized
by statute, because of average attendance of less than six
pupils for 10 consecutive days, in view of provision in such
statute that school can be closed only if proper and conven
ient school facilities for pupils can be provided in another
school in same territory until closed school may be reopened
by board.

(R. C. 1914-3, 15-2509)
(h)

Grant County.
FACTS :

Reich V, Dietz School District N o . 16.
( 1952)

55 N. W. 2d 638

This is an action in which a parent voluntar

ily transported his own children to school after refusing
several offers by the school district to furnish vehicular
transportation or its equivalent.

For such transportation

the plaintiff parent sought more compensation than that
fixed by statute to pay transportation charges.
RULE: As used in statute authorizing school district
to furnish vehicular transportation for pupils and in stat
ute authorizing school district to pay transportation allow
ance to each family living more than two miles from school
district, the words "to each family" are not to be construed
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as meaning ”to every family," but, on contrary, statutes,
when construed together, authorize school board in its dis
cretion to pay some patrons according to number of miles
travelled and to furnish other patrons vehicular transporta
tion or its equivalent.
Parent voluntarily transporting his own children to
school after refusing several offers by school district to
furnish vehicular transportation or its equivalent could
recover only compensation fixed by statute authorizing
school district to pay transportation charges, there being
no implied contract with school district for reasonable
value of parent's services.
1943 * 15-3^1-05-)

(NDRC 191^.9 Supp. lS-3k-0k.; NDRC

(Citation also applies to preceding para

graph, )
Key 160.

Compulsory attendance.
(a)

State ex re1. Fried v. MeDona Id.

( 1926 )

208 N. W. 99 (53 N. D. 7 2 3 )

FACTS :

In this action the relator, Jacob Fried,

seeks relief from a Judgment of the district court of Morton
County,

He was prosecuted on the charge of having violated

the Compulsory School Attendance Law, section 13^2, C. L.
19 13, as amended by chapter 206, S. L. 1917.

imposed.

A fine was

Defendant is the sheriff of Morton County.

Relator, Fried, is the parent of four children of
school age residing within Crown Butte school district No.
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15.

It is not disputed that the relator lives more than two

and one-fourth miles from the nearest school, and that the
school board offered to pay the defendant 50 cents a day for
transporting his children to school.
It is the contention of the state that the tender of
compensation is the equivalent of offering transportation,
within subdivision 5 of section 131^2 , and that, the parent
having failed to require his children to attend school after
such tender by the board, he violated the provisions of the
Compulsory School Attendance Law.
RULE ;

Where board of common school district offers

to pay 50 cents per day per family for transporting pupils
living more than two and one-quarter miles from school, but
does not offer actual carriage of children, their parent and
guardian is not subject to the penalties of Compulsory
School Attendance Law.

(Laws 1911» c . 266, section 232,

subd. i4-, amended by Laws 1913» c. 267--Comp. Laws 1913,
section 131^.2— , amended by Laws 1915, c. lij-l, and Laws 1917»
c. 206.)
DECISION :
mitted.

Relator, Fried, to be released.

Fine re

Not guilty.
(b)

State V. Kesse1.

( 1926)

20 8 N, W.

814.5 ( 53 N. D. 723)
FACTS ;

Evidence in this action was held sufficient

to establish that the residence of the defendant was within
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two and one-fourth miles of the school by the nearest route,
yet he failed to send his children of school age to school.
RULE;

(1)

Complaint charging failure to send chil

dren to school, as required by statute, and alleging facts
constituting offense charging it to be contrary to form of
statute and against peace and dignity of state, was suffi
cient, even though specific statute had been amended (Comp.
Laws 1913, sections 1314-2 , 10685* 10693* Laws 1915* c . II4.I;
Laws 191 7 * c, 2 0 6 ).
(2)

Evidence he Id sufficient to establish residence

of person accused of violation of Compulsory School Attend
ance Law was within two and one-fourth miles from school by
nearest route (Comp. Laws 1913* section 1314-2 , as amended by
Laws 1917 * c. 2 0 6 ).
DECISION ; Judgment against defendant affirmed.
Key 161 . Truants and truant officers and schools.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 162 .

School terms, vacations, and holidays.
(a)

( 1930 )

State ex re1 Beierle v. Sei be 1«

230 N. W. 73 I4.

FACTS : This is an action in which the plaintiffs
attempted to compel the officers of a common school district
to open and conduct a school within the district.

The

school district within which the petitioners reside had at
one time organized schools which were conducted in four
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school buildings within the district.

On or about March 8,

1 9 2 8 , the school conducted in building No, I4. was discontin

ued owing to lack of attendance.

During the following

school year additional children of school age moved into
that portion of the district previously accommodated by the
school that was closed, the total number not being suffi
cient to invoke the

mandatory duty of the school board to

organize a separate section.
RULE ;

Board could not be compelled to reopen one of

district schools, though new children moved into territory
previously accommodated by closed school (Comp. Laws 1913,
section 1 1 8 9 , and section II8 8 , as amended by Laws 1923,
c. 2 8 3 ).
Key 1 6 3 .

Grades or classes and departments.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 1614.,

Curriculum and courses of study,
(a)

^

a_l. V.

State ex re 1. Langer. Attorney Genera 1

Totten et

( 1919)

175 N. W. (

N. D.

557)
FACTS ;

This

is an original application to the Su

preme Court to compel the board of

administration and the

educational commission to refrain from preparing and pre
scribing the courses of study for the common schools of the
state.
RULE:

(1)

The Legislature, under Const, sections
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li|.7» 1 5 1 * except as restricted by constitutional limitations,
possesses the power to regulate the educational system and
public schools of the state, and to prescribe the courses of
study in such schools.
(2 ) The Board of Administration Act, known as S. B.
No. 13k.t enacted by Legislature in 1919 and referred to and
adopted by the people, so far as granting to the board of
administration specific power to control preparation of
courses of study in common schools is not unconstitutional
as interfering with and taking away prerogatives possessed
by superintendent of public instruction as a constitutional
officer under Const, sections 82, 8 3 .
(3)

The superintendent of public instruction has no

constitutional or inherent power to prescribe and prepare
the c ourses of study for the common schools of the state;
such right having been granted to the Legislature by Const,
section 8 3 .
(14.)

Under Board of Administration Act, enacted in

1919 » pursuant to Senate Bill No,

13l|., specifically granting

to such board the supervision of preparation of courses of
study for public schools, and by section 9 making powers of
superintendent of public instruction subject to supervision
only so far as such powers were subject to supervision of
state board of education and boards to which Board of Admin
istration succeeded, such superintendent has power to

#
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prescribe courses of study in common schools subject to
supervision by Board of Administration.
Key 1 6 5 .

Religious instruction and reading of

Scriptures.
(a)

Gerhardt v. Heid.

For brief, see ante Key 2, Case (a).
Further ruling in this case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows :
Conduct of sectarian religious exercises and giving
of sectarian instruction in public schools is prohibited by
Constitution,

(Const, sections i|., 147, 152.)

Key 1 6 6 .

Textbooks.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 1 6 7 ,

Selection or adoption and change.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 1 6 8 .

Duty to furnish.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 1 6 9 .

Control of pupils and discipline in general.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 1 7 0 .

Rules and regulations.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 1 7 1 .

Authority to make.

Key 1 7 2 .

Reasonableness and validity.
(a)

Stromberg v. French et a 1.

2 3 6 N. W. 477 (60 N. D. 7 5 0 )
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FACTS ; This action was brought to restrain the de
fendants from enforcing the following rule adopted by the
board of education of the city of Langdon, to wit:

"Notice

is hereby given that on and after September 29, 1930, any
boy wearing metal heel plates on his shoes will be refused
admittance to classes and will be suspended or expelled
until the heel plates are removed."
complied with this request.
boys who used heel plates.

The boys in the school

Murray Stromberg was one of the
His mother noticed that he had

removed the plates and directed him to replace them.

He

complied with his mother’s direction and the school authori
ties, objecting, sent him home until such time as he should
remove them.

Plaintiff was informed of this action of the

principal and superintendent and at once interviewed them.
He insisted that as a parent he had the right to determine
what apparel his boy should wear at school.

So this action

evo Ived.
RULE : Special school district board of education may
forbid pupils to wear metal heel plates (Comp. Laws 1913,
section 1251).
Hey 172 ^.

Construction and operation.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 173 . Violation of rules and offenses.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 174'

Punishment.
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No cases In North Dakota.
Key 175*

In general.
No cases In North Dakota.

Key 176.

Corporal punishment.
No cases in North Dakota.

Key 177.

Expulsion or suspension.
(a)

Stromberg v. French.

For brief, see ante Key 172, Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section, as
follows :
Pupil*s intentional refusal to observe board of edu
cation’s rule because of parent's command constitutes "in
subordination," within statute respecting suspension or ex
pulsion (Comp. Laws 1913, section 1251).
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CHAPTER XI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The background of school law £s the story of educa
tion.
Practically every important phase of public education
has come before the court in one way or another, and it will
be noted, from the nature of the cases, that common-sense
principles emerging from experiences as a society underlie
the legal structure which controls the schools.

It is

natural that questions relative to the meaning of legal pro
visions affecting schools and people connected with schools
are bound to arise.

The reason for existing confusions is,

of course, that no laws apply specifically to the question
at hand, and differences arise as to their implied applica
tions .
The State Constitution is the foundation of the edu
cational system, with the legislature as the most important
agency of the people in determining the educational policies
of the state.

Education therefore is a state function, and

it is the responsibility of the state to enact laws Uhlch
assure to all children equal and satisfactory educational
opportunities.
This summary is devoted to a general discussion of
the more important issues of school law which have been
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considered by the Supreme Court in North Dakota.

To present

the results of every case would be merely repetitious.
PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES
This chapter contained but one case* Gerhardt v.
Heid*

1

in which sectarianism was the issue.

The court held

that teachers may wear religious garb in the public school
without violating the law, if there is no attempt made to
give sectarian or religious instruction.
ESTABLISHMENT, SCHOOL LANDS, FUNDS,
AND REGULATIONS IN GENERAL
A review of the eleven cases reported reveals two
principal issues:

(1)

In State ex rel. v. Board of Univer

sity and School Lands v. McMi1lan^ the court established
that the proceeds from the sale of what is commonly termed
"school lands" constitutes a permanent trust fund which may
be used only for educational purposes, and (2) that the
right of the board to exercise its discretion in the invest
ment of the money of the permanent school fund, which was
challenged in Moses v. Baker,3 was affirmed by the court.
^ 267 N. W. 127.
2 96 N. W. 310.
3 299 N. W. 3 1 5 .
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CREATION, ALTERATION, EXISTENCE, AND
DISSOLUTION OF DISTRICTS
Twenty-seven cases pertain to this chapter.
Laws enacted for the consolidation or division of
school districts are based solely on legislative discretion
or policy.

There are no limitations on the legislature re

garding laws for reorganization of school districts (School
District N o . 9ii v. King)

And the legislature, having com

plete power over school districts, may provide for the divi
sion of property and the apportionment of the debts when a
portion of the territory or property of one district is
transferred to the jurisdiction of another (Coler v, Dwlght
School Township).^
An incorporated village constituting part of three
common school districts may be organized as a special school
district (Bi11ings Schoo1 Di str ict v, Loma Specia 1 Schoo1
Pistr ict).^ and a school district composed of an incorpor
ated city alone is empowered to include adjoining territory
annexed to the city (Weeks v. Hetland)
If the legislature confers on a special board.
^

127N. W. 5 1 5 .

^ 55 N. w, 5 8 7 .
^

219 N. W. 336.

^

202 N. W. 8 0 7 .

*
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composed of county commissioners and the county superintend
ent, the power to organize new school districts (Ta 1Imadge
Û

V,

WaIker).

then the action of the board in granting a

petition and organizing a new district is legislative, not
Judicial, in character, and the members of the board are
not bound to take oath as to whether the new school district
is desirable or necessary after having been satisfied that
it was for the best interests of the territory affected
( State V. Strauss)

Further, the board of county commis

sioners and the county superintendent, upon being petitioned
to do so by at least two thirds of the school voters re
siding within a proposed new school district, are authorized
to organize such new district from another district or por
tions of districts already organized.

The power thus con

ferred upon the board to organize a new common school dis
trict i_s_ not made dependent upon the vote of the people of
the proposed new district (Bloomington School Pistrict v ,
Larson).

However, the special board must, in all cases

involving redistricting, exercise its powers to conform with
statute.^ ^

Q 159 N. W. 71.
^ 187 N. W. 9614..
207 N. W. 650.
Ibid.
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GCVERNMENT, OFFICERS, AND DISTRICT MEETINGS
The significant issue in this chapter, which reports
nineteen cases, is that officers must at all times exercise
only powers granted by statutory law (legislative authority)
(Gi1lespie v. Common School District N o . ;8, McClean
County).

and an action of directors does not bind a school

district unless taken at a meeting held and conducted ac
cording to provisions of statutes.
In adopting and enforcing rules and regulations for
the conduct of schools, school boards must always gauge
their procedures in light of the legislative policy that
public schools shall be equally free and open, and accessi
ble to all children over six and under twenty-one years of
age, a prevailing rule (Batty v. Board of Education of City
of Wi lliston)
DISTRICT PROPERTY, CONTRACTS AND LIABILITIES
In this area twenty cases are presented, the majority
of which are devoted to powers and authorities of school
officers in administering the affairs of the school district.
216 N. W.
Ibid.
269 N. W. J4.
9.

•

_
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1714It should he noted that they must always proceed according
to statute, as in Chapter V preceding.
Boards of directors of common school districts are
charged with the duty of erecting schoolhouses when directed
by the majority of voters in the district (Henderson v. Long
Creek School Pi strict No. 2),^^ and statutes concerning
petitions to school boards to call an election regarding a
school site and the building of a schoolhouse are mandatory
before an election, but directory thereafter; that is, stat
utes concerning petitions for elections must be strictly
followed.

In a proceeding brought prior to election to en

force the requirements of such petitions the court will en
force the requirements of the statute and no election can be
held without meeting the requirements of the petition stat
ute.

However, should the same proceeding be brought after a

free election has been held, the same court will not void
the election on the basis that, no complaint having been
made prior to the election, the requirements of petition are
met and it will be presumed that the board or other agency,
as the case may be, had performed their duty and exercised
their discretion according to law (State v. Wyndmere School
District of Richland County).

However, a contract to

171 N. W. 825.
215 N. W. 267.
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build a schoolhouse for an amount In excess of funds avail
able is void if the school board had no authority to make
it, and subsequent ratification could not make it binding
upon the district (Capita 1 Bank of St. Paul v. School District N o . 53 of Barnes County).

But contracts entered

into by school districts, even if they were irregularly
made, may become binding upon the district by subsequent
ratification, if the contract had been within the power of
the district when executed (St, Paul Foundry Co. v, Burnstad
School 1)1St. No. 11).^®
DISTRICT DEBTS, SECURITIES, AND TAXATION
The power of school districts to incur indebtedness
is limited by the Constitution and statutes, and a contract
which increases the indebtedness of the district beyond the
limit is void (Anderson v. Internationa 1 School Dtstrlet No,
School districts may exercise the power of taxation
only under valid delegation by the legislature, and statute
limits the taxes that may be expended by the county auditor
for school purposes (Great Northern Railway Co. v. Duncan).^®

i4.8 N. W. 363.
269 N. W. 738.
19 156 N. W. 54.
176 N. W. 992.
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A resident and taxpayer within a school district is
entitled to bring suit on his own behalf and on the behalf
of the public to prevent unlawful expenditures and waste of
the district’s funds (Weeks v. Met land) ^
CLAIMS AGAINST DISTRICTS, AND ACTIONS
This chapter contains three cases, the most signifi
cant holding that Judgment against a school district may be
collected only under statute providing for levying taxes to
pay the judgment (Auran v. Mentor School District N o . _1 of
22

Divide County).

The holding is significant because the

law does not contemplate an involuntary appropriation of
funds necessary in the operation and maintenance of a public
institution.

To do so would work irrevocable harm against

such institution.

In the alternative, and applicable to

school districts, the legislature has provided a system of
additional taxation to replace the judicial remedies of
garnishment
TEACHERS
This chapter contains fourteen cases which generally
point out that the teaching position is considered not to be
202 N, W. 807.
22 228 N. W. i^.35.
23 Ibid.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

177

that of public officers, but of employees (Mootz v. Be 1yea);^^ and possession of a teacher*s certificate is a
necessary prerequisite to appointment or employment (Hosmer
V.

Sheldon School District)

However, a teacher may be

uncertified when a contract is made, and may be granted a
certificate before actual teaching begins ; and if the certif
icate is so granted, the transaction is valid (Schafer v,
Johns);

pi

and the right of a teacher to recover compensation

for services rendered is dependent upon possession of the
proper certificate or license, where required by statute
(Sandry v, Brooklyn School District)
In an action to dismiss a teacher, where a mode of
procedure is prescribed, the latter must be followed in
order for the dismissal to be valid (see citation 23 above).
And where a teacher is dismissed without cause before the
expiration of his term of employment, he is paid to date of
dismis-sal, and if suit for breach of the teacher's contract
resulting from dismissal was not tried until term of employ
ment expired, amount recoverable by the teacher is the con
tract price, less what he earned, or could have earned by

^

236 N. W. 358.

25 59 N. W. 1035.
237 N. W. 1^81.
27 102 N. W. 689.
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reasonable diligence» subsequent to his discharge (Seher v .
Woodlawn District No » 2 6 . Kidder County)
PUPILS, CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE
Four of the twenty cases reported

OF SCHOOLS
in this chapter

broadly summarize the issues involved.
A district school board must furnish adequate, con
venient, and proper facilities for every child of school age
in the district (McWithy v . Heart River School District N o ,
2^);^^ and any child of school age, living within the dis
trict
of

under the care, custody or control of a resident there

is a resident of that district (Anderson v, Breitbarth).^^
A pupil’s intentional refusal to observe a board of

education rule because of a parent’s command constitutes
"insubordination," within the statute respecting suspension
or expulsion (Stromberg v . French)
Finally, the Constitution empowers the legislature to
regulate the educational system and public schools of the
state, and to prescribe the courses of study within the
schools ( State v . Totten)
59 N. W. 2d 8 0 5 .
32 N. W. 2d 886.

N. W. 14.8 3 .
2 3 6 N. W. ij.77.
175 N. w. 563.
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The recurring emphasis upon legislation to establish
"adequate, proper, and convenient" facilities for all chil
dren of school age was marked throughout this study.

Fur

ther, it is apparent that the regulation of schools and
school districts is a state function, with certain powers
delegated to the officers of school districts, and permis
sive privileges, such as the right to petition and vote,
being granted to the electors of districts.

The control of

moneys and property is cause for most litigation; but such
litigation is generally the outgrowth of local misconcep
tions and misinterpretations of the law which eventually
must be clarified by decision of the court.
The cases ^ i c h have been represented in Chapter II
through Chapter X of this summary were studied to determine
the number and types of cases and the pervading principles
of school law which were most frequently employed in the
court decisions.
A number of conclusions may be made in wake of the
cases and the summary which precede.

In some instances, the

motives and compulsions of the litigants are clear; in other
instances, the causes of litigation are either privy to the
individual or individuals involved.

Certainly, in many

cases the litigants, especially the district citizens who
are confronted with the possibility of redistricting and
consolidation, feel that their private rights have been

«
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invaded* and that, perhaps, the law is interfering with
their freedom to make decisions involving problems which arc
privy and singular to the district.
Also, tenacious claim to property, whether it be per
sonal or belonging to the district, insinuates Itself into
11ti gâtions.
In North Dakota there is a prevailing opinion that no
body or individual outside the district is as Intimately
familiar with the problems of that particular community as
is the school board and the people whom it represents.

The

rural community feels its rights have been established by a
pattern of long-established processes.

Indeed, the people

do not hesitate to take their school matters to court be
cause they arc certain that their claims are substantiated
by long-adhercd-to practice, the law notwithstanding.

They

arc defiantly confident that their rights will be upheld.
Rural communities cling to the country school because
( 1) it is still the center of the farm community, (2) the
people fee 1 they are adjusted to such problems as, for exam
ple, their particular tax problem, and (3) the citizens fee 1
that they still have some local control over the education
of their children.
Repeatedly, in this summation, reference has been
made to the redistricting and consolidation problem, which
exists because citizens in towns and villages, for example.
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realize that, in a sense, survival of their ccanmunity de
pends upon the maintenance of their school.

The school,

they feel, keeps the community "together."
It is not the purpose of this thesis to argue pros
and cons of these problems.

However, there are factors

which will inevitably serve to alleviate the difficulties
and mi sunderstandings which have been arising relative to
redistricting and consolidation:

(1) country roads are

being improved; (2) centers of trade are shifting from the
rural village to the larger centers of activity; (3) In the
rural communities there has been an infiltration of informa
tion regarding problems of education, and Parent-Teacher
Associations are being more widely organized.

As a result

of these factors, plus the fact that school tax levies In
the rural school districts have become prohibitively exces
sive, litigations should be considerably reduced in number
and complexity, and rural areas will cease to struggle for
survival of the local "country school" district where ques
tions of redistricting and consolidation arise.
An examination, then, of the problems giving rise to
the greatest number of cases, relative to school law, which
have been brought before the North Dakota Supreme Court,
namely, cases concerned with redistricting and consolidation^
reveals that the motives behind such litigations are based
upon the desire of the district ^

maintain loca 1 contro 1.
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plus the fact, of course, that moneys and properties are
irtvolved.
Finally, it may be observed that the enactments of
the state legislature are supreme in school legislation
unless the constitutionality of a law passed by that body
is challenged; then the issue is placed before the Supreme
Court of the State of North Dakota.
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